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Reform of the oil sector is long overdue. The problems in the sector emanate from the 
structure of central taxes and the system of subsidisation through prices.  Solutions to the 
problems necessarily have to address both tax and subsidy simultaneously. The social losses 
include, misuse / wasteful use of scarce petroleum resources,  diversion, adulteration, other 
avoidable  negative externalities,  improper substitution between products, tax arbitrage, 
distortion of consumer preferences and input choices of industries, and  international cross 
hauling of petroleum. Nearly all these costs, and problems arise not because of subsidisation 
per se but due to the use of varying retail prices that are used to  subsidise. Prices for the 
same product vary for different consumers besides. They also vary across products.  These 
tax /subsidy variations are the root cause of nearly  all problems in the sector. Autonomous 
price variations (i.e. those resulting from the actions of  firms (under a regime of non-
distortionary subsidies) would be small and  not subject to ‘arbitrage’ i.e. to the realisation of 
rents through diversion and adulteration.  
Tax reform – viz casting all taxes in the form of  value added taxes has not taken place in the 
sector despite the passage of nearly 15 years since such reform was put in place in  nearly all 
                                                  
1 This paper is a version of Report “A Study of the Fiscal Regime for the Petroleum Sector in 
the Context of Rising Input Prices, of the Changes Required in the Sector, and of a Plan of 
Action to Achieve the Same”, by Sebastian Morris (coordinator), Jayanth Varma and S.K. 
Barua, submitted to the Petroleum Federation of India, New Delhi. The authors are thankful 
to Mr. A.K. Arora (Director General, Petrofed India) and Mr. Yogendra Sahai (Director, 
Communications and Marketing, Petrofed India) for both permission to bring out this working 
paper and for the financial support provided. Copyright: The data and other contents in part 
or in full in this publication cannot be copied, reproduced , republished etc for non-personal 
or commercial use without obtaining the prior permission of the Petrofed in writing. Copyright 
laws apply. Any alteration of the material contained in this publication in violation of the 
Copyright Laws is strictly prohibited. 
2 Professors at the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad. Their emails are 
morris@iimahd.ernet.in,  jrvarma@iimahd.ernet.in, and skbarua@iimahd.ernet.in . The 
authors are thank Prof. Ajay Pandey for extensive comments. They are also thankful to the 
Petrofed for all the support provided. They especially thank all those who commented on 
earlier versions of this report from industry, government and other sectors.  However, the 
views expressed herein are the authors own and should not be construed as either the views 
of the sponsors or any sections of the industry or of the Indian Institute of Management 
Ahmedabad.  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 3 
other sectors of manufacturing.  Complete deregulation of the sector allowing oil producers, 
oil refiners, marketing companies, and integrated operators to price their products as they 
deem fit. Recast central indirect taxes (excise whether specific or ad valorem) into a value 
added tax, as for any other product., i.e., allowing input credit for all registered intermediate 
users of petroleum products is overdue. Central government revenues can be protected by 
working out a revenue neutral value added tax rate. This we have  estimated approximately 
to be  110-120% of value added uniformly to all  segments in the industry. Such a tax regime 
would also be neutral to the  degree of vertical integration and remove the biases in the use 
of  products. The Public Distribution System (PDS) is not necessary and ought to be 
dismantled.  Kerosene would then be  sold in the open market for all consumers. Kerosene 
could also be sold by retail outlets, kirana shops, other retail outlets,  and by current PDS 
retailers on par with kirana shops/ ROs. Ditto for LPG. Subsidies are administered through 
endowments defined upfront, which allows the subsidised consumer to access his/her 
endowments, trade the same, convert the same into cash all without the causing any 
distortion. Only pipelines are subject to regulation by the Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Regulator.   
The second best proposals  involve the  changes/recommendations  as before but additionally 
creates a “Crude Price Stabilisation Fund” (CSF) that allows crude prices (both sharp rises and 
sudden falls) to be moderated, so that  pass thru is influenced by the managers of the  CSF. 
It is important that the CSF is set up as in independent body and insulated from the 
government and is governed by strict and automatic rules that make rapid price adjustment 
(to the market prices) necessary when the fund position is low, so that the probability of the 
fund going bankrupt is kept at nearly zero. A fund between  $ 25 to 40 billion is envisaged. A 
fund of $40 billion (Rs. 200,000 crore) envisaged as a credit line would work in most 
situations. The fund would operate with strict limits on the quantum of the credit line used to 
pay out stabilization subsidies during the boom phase of the price cycle as also on the 
accumulated reserves built up from stabilization taxes during the bust phase of the price 
cycle. To ensure that such crude stabilisation measures do not affect the competitiveness of 
the industry exports of product (and crude) are taxed when crude is subsidised, and 
subsidised when crude is taxed. Appropriate conversion factors would apply. The conversion 
factor should be based on a refinery loss of between 10 and 7% say 8.5%.  
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Reform of the Fiscal and Subsidy Regime for the 
Petroleum Sector 
SECTION I 
OIL IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
Introduction 
While there are global markets in crude and petroleum products these are not the 
perfectly competitive markets of the economists. Several factors have contributed to 
the imperfection in the markets. Firstly, oil being a natural resource with widely 
varying costs of production has necessarily involved the generation of vast rents. 
Since the variation in rates of extraction from wells is good enough to accommodate 
seasonal changes in demand, this in itself is not an important reason for the large 
price volatility, given the current stock of wells and their maximal yield. The yield 
variations though would be inadequate to respond to the speculative changes in 
demand.  
The response to the rising demands, before the formation of the OPEC cartel was for 
the international oil companies to hold capacities of extraction with sufficient reserve 
capacity to meet the variability in oil demands. The pre-emption of oil reserves by 
these companies ensured very high profits for these companies. Profit maximization 
in this situation of high income elasticity and “competition” among these oligopolists, 
low price elasticity and rising world incomes, meant stable prices. Crude oil prices 
ranged between $ 2.50 and 3.00 from 1947 to the late sixties. When adjusted for 
price inflation and the prices are taken to 2007 dollars, then the crude prices could 
have varied between $14 and 18 per barrel over the same period. Indeed in real 
terms the price had declined to about $14 in  the early 70s. The OPEC had been set 
up in 1960.  
The OPEC which had not acted in any significant way until 1970, realized its power in 
1973 with the Yom Kippur War. During the War the Arab states imposed an oil 
embargo cutting production by about 5m bpd. While about 1m bpd was 
compensated by increased production by other oil producers, the output fall and the 
speculation that followed was enough to drive current prices of oil to $12 a barrel. 
(Energy Economist Newsletter 2008). Since then oil price have been relatively volatile  
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responding to world events  but especially those in the middle east – Iranian 
Revolution, the Iran Iraq War, and the Iraq Wars. See Fig. 1. 
Transition from Multinational Dominated Oil Production 
As demands for national control and sharing of benefits from oil extraction emerged, 
governments responded in a variety of ways – forcing multinational oil companies to 
form JVs with state owned enterprises (SOEs) to share/ appropriate the profits. They 
also  imposed  taxes and large royalties on oil. Nationalisation and the setting up of 
state owned oil extraction companies were also the common during this period. As 
countries with large reserves and low domestic consumption seized control over their 
oil assets the ability to influence global oil prices through control and restraint over 
the amount of oil produced emerged.    
While OPEC has been formed as early as 1960, it was only in 1972 that it was able to 
exercise its muscle, once its membership included all surplus producers outside the 
Communist Bloc, and governments were able to seize a degree of control over the oil 
MNCs.  OPEC itself have had internal contradictions. Thus one set of OPEC countries 
would like to keep prices high even it that meant substitution in the long run. Such 
countries would typically have relatively low reserves (most of the OPEC players). 
Those with very large reserves (largely Saudi Arabia, and also possibly Iraq, Nigeria) 
that are expected to last many years at current rates of exploitation on the other 
hand would prefer to keep prices high but not high enough to bring about significant 
substitution.  This has lead many commentators to question the OPECs capacity to 
operate as a cartel. It has no enforcement mechanism to ensure that  production 
cuts are implemented.  
More often than not it is only Saudi Arabia’s capacity to implement cuts
3 as well as to 
i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n   t h a t  h a s  b e e n  i n f l u e ntial. This was most evident during the 
period 1982-85 when OPEC’s attempt at setting low production quotas did not work 
since  most members violated the same.  
                                                  
3 With a very small return to its reserves and vast holdings of foreign investments in liquid 
form , Saudi Arabia can accommodate major variation in the dollar revenues it generates by 
selling oil. Out of current sales of oil much is saved in international banks and institutions 
besides securities of advanced country governments.   
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Saudi Arabia tried to cut back even more steeply than what it had agreed to  but 
when others did not follow, Saudi Arabia abandoned and the policy. As a result the 
price of oil fell to under $10 per barrel in 1986. 
Nevertheless after the two oil shocks the price of oil had not witnessed the sharp 
spikes that have been its characteristic over this century. Oil in terms of 2007 prices 
kept between $18 and $30 over the period from 1986 to 1999. The US influence over 
Saudi Arabia possibly kept oil prices lower than what they would have been even up 
to end 2000 given that the economic inter e s t  o f  t h e  U S  l a y  in low international 
prices.  
That changed dramatically after 2000 and especially after 9/11 in 2001. The lobby 
behind the Bush administration which had interests in oil pushed foreign policy of the 
US to result in higher prices of oil which while it may have been hurtful to the US 
economy allowed high profits for companies in the sector. The oil companies with 
upstream assets in oil wells (even if through JVs and production sharing 
arrangements) stood to gain from rise in crude prices. The strategy of high oil prices 
without a significant drop in world demand was sustained by the searing pace of 
growth of the Chinese economy, and since 2003 of the pick up in growth of the 
Indian. In both economies despite the fall in energy and oil elasticities the demand 
growth stemming from a trend growth in GDP of 10+% and 8+% respectively were 
large.  The recent world wide recession has of course upset the strategy but in the 
long run since Chinese growth (and possibly the Indian) growth is sustainable the 
upward rise in growth can be exploited by the oil speculators  in the form of higher 
oil prices.  An added factor that sparked off the sharp rise was the Iraq war which 
knocked out a significant part of supplies. 
The Recent Recession and Fall in Prices 
The recent sharp fall in oil prices to under $36 (current prices) after it had rise to 
over $130 per barrel is the result of an abnormal situation of world wide recession  
which portends to be the deepest since the Great Depression. Since Asian countries 
are waiting to grow  and have no fundamental problem keeping them from high 
growth, and Keynesian demand side policies are being actively pursued, it is quite 
unlikely that  that the recession would last very long. At the first signs of revival oil 
prices would firm up and rise as China and the Asian countries pick up their growth.  
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$50 could be considered as a floor once the recovery is on, i.e. over the next decade. 
During the East Asian currency crisis crude prices had dipped to $10 in December 
1998 sine the OPEC has not been able to estimate the import of the crisis and cut 
back production sufficiently. 
Before the recent spike oil taxes had emerged as a significant component of 
government revenues not only in oil producing economies but also in many oil 
consuming economies – Europe, India, China etc. As prices rose very steeply the 
need to cut these taxes have been felt in many of these economies in order to 
moderate the spike.  
Spot prices in oil have since 1974 been volatile since the spot markets have been 
thin relative to the total quantity of oil that is traded. A significant part of the oil is 
bought on medium term contracts. But as these contracts themselves look back on 
spot prices (being linked to them with weights less than unity), the role of market 
prices have no doubt increased. [In contrast, in the case of natural gas which is less 
tradable than oil the role of global market prices are smaller in the overall prices paid 
by consumers though even here the linkage with crude and with prices of gas in 
principal markets in long term contracts is increasing by the day].  
The volatility in crude prices has been compounded by the long gestation in 
developing new oil wells. And the inevitable long term rise in oil (barring a sudden 
development of revolutionary technologies) would mean that the volatility in the 
prices is also going to be high as oil prices rise. Like any other commodity there is 
much speculation in oil. But unlike in many commodities the low storage capacities 
relative to annual demand has been a factor that have kept volatility high (despite 
the variability in production that existing wells are capable of which counteracts the 
impact the low storage.[OPEC behaviour has as mentioned before played a 
counteracting role, at least since the late nineties]. 
Rents in Oil 
Economic costs of production (excluding all taxes and impositions such as royalties) 
range from as low as US$ 2 a barrel to as high as $30 or even more. Therefore 
besides the scarcity rent the differential rents are very high. Large rents in any 
industry create their own dynamics and state intervention including ownership /  
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control over oil is one result. When state systems have been weak (as in Nigeria or 
Columbia) and oil reserves are high there is compounding of the weakness of the 
state to result in state failure.  Entrenched kleptocracies that do not go away even as 
governments change, with  the oil companies being deeply involved in the politics 
and decision making in such societies are typical outcomes. Where governments are 
potentially weak, in not having the popular mandate ( Brunei, Saudi Arabia, UAE) but 
are otherwise strong, the alliance of such governments with international powers 
often mediated by the giant oil companies is an important feature of their 
governance and of their system of exploitation of oil. 
Retail oil product prices have varied greatly being lowest in some of the OPEC 
countries.  Among the rich countries prices have varied depending almost entirely on 
the local taxes.  Oil taxes have been an important source of revenue for many 
governments.  Thus OPEC estimated that consumption taxes on oil accounted for an 
annual average of over $500 billion for the G-7 countries c. 2007/8. 
Revenues from Oil 
In many non-oil LDCs, oil taxes are important sources of revenue for the 
government.  A World Bank estimate puts the taxes on gasoline and diesel to be 
67% or 59% of the final price in OECD countries and 44% and 40% for a set of non-
OECD countries. For kerosene in non-OECD countries the taxes amounted to as 
much as 23% of the final price.  (Bacon, Robert, 2001). Oil resources are very 
unevenly distributed in relation to that of most other resources of wide use (iron and 
bauxite ores, coal or even gas for that matter). Despite this and the high price 
volatility, the preference for oil is high since it can be processed into easily storable 
liquids which have the ease of application and of being transported as well. The 
capital costs involved in applying oil, relative to gas, or coal, not only in mobile 
applications but also in small scale industries, is low which gives an added advantage 
to oil for developing countries which are typically capital (and coordination) short. 
India itself is no exception since its oil demand despite long years of very high user 
prices for oil has not quelled its demand in favour of derived fuels from say coal and 
gas, and gas itself. Part of the problem may well have been the poor institutional 
feature which has not brought about the requisite adjustment despite the high 
relative prices of oil.   
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 9 
Oil and Substitutes 
Oil by nearly all counts would be the first fossil fuel to get exhausted. Shales and tar 
sands are currently expensive to exploit and are unlikely to be exploited since such 
oil would have to compete with, not the peak prices of oil, but the fall back prices of 
oil which can be low in a situation when demand is low.  This is so since much of the 
costs in oil production are really rents or are capex to prove more oil. Similarly such 
oil would have to also compete with coal which in the advanced countries would only 
have to bear the operational costs since the fixed costs are already sunk (in the 
current situation when no further significant additions to capacity are contemplated).  
In short the variations in the prices of oil despite the high average prices puts a 
disincentive on the development of alternative energies of not just shales and tar 
sands but also of potentially viable but as of now expensive (capital intensive) 
alternatives such as solar and wind. Such risks which are not being mitigated by 
suitable counteractive socially relevant policies in the more important countries has 
t h u s  f a r  k e p t  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  m u c h  b e l o w  t h e  p o t e n t i a l .  A s  s u c h  o i l  
prices have continued to generally rise. Moreover as a resource nears exhaustion its 
prices could conceivable rise high enough to mop up all the savings from its intrinsic 
advantages over substitutes. The response of the gas industry has been quite large 
though, because inter alia of some degree of commonality of ownership of the two 
resources and because oil and gas are to an extent found together.  This has been 
the main mitigating factor in the other wise even more rapid price of oil that would 
have happened. Counteracting this mitigation has been the increasing use of gas 
over coal.  Environmental and emissions norms imposed on power producers 
especially in the US since such norms are difficult to meet with coal and  this has 
resulted in gas being used not only to meet new  demand but also replacement 
demand as coal gives way. This has further dampened the substitution of oil with 
gas. It has also limited and slowed considerably the exploitation of coal in countries 
like the US has lead to their exports instead of first best (local) use. 
Optimal Tariff and Competition for Rents 
Since for large net consuming economies (today, Japan, US, Europe, and now China 
and India) the “small country” assumption cannot be made, the developments 
including the fiscal developments in these economies can affect the global prices of  
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oil. Similarly, the net producing countries by controlling supply, and through fiscal 
measures can influence global prices. This creates a situation of large net buyers 
being in a situation, where from the requirements of “optimal tariff”, high import 
taxes on petroleum products can be justified.  Simultaneously, the large net suppliers 
(with low production costs) can justify large export taxes. In the play between such 
players who collectively would have the most influence on  the international market 
for petroleum products, the taxes would only rise. This is one of the factors that 
underlie the stability of the current system of highly variable producer and consumer 
level taxes and levies on petroleum products. 
As the bargaining power has slowly but surely shifted way from the buyers to the 
supplier countries (as demand growth has been maintained by high overall growth of 
the world economy) and the prices have risen, the scope for tax revenues being 
realized at the production level have heightened vis-à-vis at the consumption end.  
This is the most important change that has taken place over the late nineties and the 
f i r s t  d e c a d e  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y .    T h e  l a rge net buyers without much oil assets 
themselves - India, South Korea, Japan, Germany, France are potentially most 
affected by this inevitable force.  
Strategic Responses to Oil Dependence 
Countries have tried to respond to their dependence on oil in a variety of ways.  
South Korea and Japan  have developed nuclear power. Brazil is endowed with 
hydro, and India and China have a large dependence on locally produced coal.  Yet 
the dependence on oil is significant  and in no country does it amount to less than  
30%.  Higher incomes increase this dependence upon oil since its  suitability in 
transport applications  is very high , and the  elasticity of transportation requirements  
to GDP being typically greater than 1
4, oil needs grow rapidly as incomes rise.  See 
table 1.  
The case of China and US are somewhat different. Although both are heavily 
dependent upon imports, their substantial domestic production would allow them the 
                                                  
4 This is so during the phase of transformation i.e. in the low and middle income phases of a 
transforming economy. As incomes rise and a functional services sector takes root the energy 
elasticity comes down significantly with much of the continuing rise in demand being on 
account of  in personal transportation, and electricity use in air-conditioning.  
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possibility of keeping oil prices low since they can cross subsidize high priced 
imported oil with the revenues (rents and taxes) from domestic oil. Their capacity to 
moderate prices, hold to lower prices and to mitigate against oil price hikes is large 
but steadily declining. As China’s growth in demand is large, it would soon move to 
the category of oil import dependent economies similar to India. Unlike India in 
anticipation of such a dependence China has moved rapidly to create state owned oil 
assets in other countries through essentially direct investment in many countries. It 
has been the biggest buyer of oil fields in recent years
5. Additionally its vast 
investments in hydro capacities would keep its energy imported at spot markets low 
in the long run as compared to India where there does not seem to be similar 
strategic initiatives.
6 
India among all the major importers is most vulnerable. The near certain scenario 
that in the next 15 years India would require to import significant amounts of energy 
in the form of oil and gas has not been used to the advantage that it could be by  
the government.  Aggressively buying oil fields, or having long term deals with 
nearby oil and gas surplus countries could have been the way forward. India is open 
to price volatility and is also subject to much insecurity since the appropriate strategy 
given its position has not been the basis of its policy with regard to oil and gas.  The 
political aspect in such potential deals have been overly heightened and there is little 
examination of counteracting measures or mitigation options that could have been 
brought to bear to seal such deals. 
                                                  
5 CNPC has production investments in 21 countries across 4 continents. Similarly SINOPEC 
and CNOOC have extensive foreign assets. While such oil from its overseas acquisitions 
constituted in 2006 only 8.5% of its total imports of oil, the fact that its fields in Angola now 
(2006) became the largest source of imports surpassing even Saudi Arabia, is indicative of its 
aggressive investments to build its own hedge in oil.  Remarkably in 2006, 46% of its imports 
of oil came from Africa. (Country Brief. China, Dept of Energy, Energy Information 
Services).India whose strategic interests lie even more closely in African materials is only an 
insignificant player there. China of course dominates in the investments in the oil fields of ex-
Soviet Central Asian countries like Kazakasthan. Similarly the share of oil imported through its 
own bottoms while low would grow very rapidly as China adds to its tanker fleet at a furious 
pace.  
6 There is no doubt that the first best strategic option for India is to buy up oil fields in other 
countries with higher probability of ensuring continuance of supply under various situations,  
or collaborate with the oil giants and others to buy up  oil  and gas assets. That India has 
could not decide to buy oil assets in the early nineties when prices were low, or that its 
‘negotiations’ to procure gas from neighboring countries – Burma, Iran, and Bangladesh 
points to basic limitations in our approach on these strategic matters. India has also not been 
able to play its near certain demand for engery imports over the next 30 years at the very 
least to advantage.  
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Varieties of Oil Surplus Countries 
Surplus oil producers can be broadly placed into several meaningful categories: (1) 
countries like Brunei, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (and now Libya) where the writ of the 
state is strong – sometimes because of the military aid and presence of western 
foreign powers; (2) Russia, Iran, the ex-Soviet Central Asia where the state systems 
continue to be strong and (3) Nigeria, Columbia etc where the writ of the state is 
severely contested and oil extraction is embroiled in local near ‘civil war” situation.  
In the latter category there is much wastage and in the extraction process and few 
investments to consolidate and marshal the resources. Thus Nigeria flares more gas 
than perhaps half the energy produced from North Sea fields! China in its search for 
oil has not stopped from considering the third category of countries, and 
incrementally the world oil sector would witness both high prices and contest for oil 
coming from China. Thus China has been active in Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Niger, 
Kenya and Indonesia.  China would also be the natural consumer for Russia’s vast 
East Siberian oil and gas fields and is leaving no stone unturned to stake its long 
term interest in the world’s energy resources.  
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SECTION 2 
OIL DEVELOPMENT AND PRICING IN INDIA: AN OVERVIEW 
Strategic Initiative in Oil  
As an independent economy with much ambition to join the comity of nations,   
advancing India adopted planning of the intersectoral consistency variety with much 
role of the state in development of infrastructure and strategic industries. The 
Industrial Policy Resolution 1956, which laid out the ownership framework provided 
for oil in the public sector  while allowing existing foreign owned firms to continue 
operations in India. The oil sector was seen as crucial to its economic transition. But 
the oil sector outside the Communist Bloc was controlled by the “seven sisters”,  and 
a quick nationalization would not have been possible without great cost to the 
economy since India was a net buyer of oil and was crucially dependent upon oil.  
Only the Soviet Union was truly independent.  Other countries like Mexico, Venezuela 
and the Middle East countries  with their own oil fields  were nevertheless 
technologically dependent on the advanced countries. But the actions of several 
states – Mexico, Iran and India most notably in using Soviet technology and 
technology to lay its own refining capacity (India set up Koyali Refinery of Indianoil) 
created the basis later to nationalize the oil sector.  
In India this was precipitated by the major multinational oil companies continuing the 
practice of transfer pricing the imports of crude from their operations elsewhere in 
the world, at prices higher than in India’s immediate vicinity – Middle East. The 
government insisted on imports at prices that did not result in vast surplus outflow. 
And the possibility of being able to depend upon Soviet supplies in case of refusal to 
supply by the oil giants allowed it to take an aggressive stance.   It nationalized the 
oil industry when the oil companied refused to source crude from cheaper Soviet 
sources. That led to the oil sector development at a more rapid pace especially of 
refining. Indian nationalized oil companies made significant progress in terms of 
technology they developed but nevertheless continued to be dependent upon global 
companies for technology.  
Globally many important pure technology providers had by the mid eighties emerged 
and this allowed the nationalized oil companies to operate without a large  
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technological handicap vis-à-vis the giants.  However,  the hold of large integrated oil 
companies continue to be significant owning to their ownership of oil fields, their 
access to the fields of important reserve countries like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, 
Columbia, Iraq, Kuwait, Brunei etc. besides their access to the biggest oil markets – 
the US, Europe and some of the Latin American countries. 
Response to the Oil Price Shock 
The oil price rises of 1974 and 1979 were in India  followed by deep price 
intervention in the market through the taxation route. This was in sharp contrast to 
the tendency then to intervene through rationing and price controls. During the 
period from 1964 almost right until the mid eighties the controls in the form of 
quotas, licenses, rationing had been the usual response to shortages and ensuring 
plan targets. The Oil Price Enquiry Committee suggested high taxes on discretionary 
oil consumption – essentially petrol, moderate taxes on diesel, fuel oil and naphtha – 
largely intermediate products then and low or negligible taxes on kerosene meant for 
final consumption by the poor (which alone was rationed). Kerosene in intermediate 
use was subject to moderate taxes. The response to the oil shock as a result of these 
measures is generally considered to be good since there was overall moderation in 
the oil consumption in the subsequent quinquennium   without hurting growth.  
Indeed the growth during the eighties had increased to 5.5% on an average from 
the low “Hindu” growth of 3.5% which was all the economy had achieved over the 
previous 15 years. Nevertheless, now we do understand that the high growth of the 
eighties were caused by the spending multiplier effects of the Gulf remittances which 
grew rapidly as the rents based spending by the oil exporting states in the middle 
east accelerated. This created a vast demand for labour resulting in significant   
outflow of labour from India and other countries to the Gulf countries. Other factors 
were the rise in agricultural growth to an average of 3.2% from the earlier under 3.0 
% during the first 15 years of the green revolution, and the fiscal profligacy which 
characterized government spending during this period. The fiscal deficit of the 
central government which even in the hey days of the Mahalanobis Plan was under 
control at less than 5% of GDP typically, during the eighties increased to reach an 
unsustainable level of over 8% of GDP which was one of the principal causal factors 
that led to the crisis of 1990-91. (Morris, Sebastian 1997)  More importantly the 
exchange rate which should have been steeply depreciated in response to the oil  
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price shock was not. The adjustment being largely on account of internal price of oil 
had a limited potential as the oil demand could not have but risen in response to the 
increased GDP since oil was relatively price inelastic (there being little other credible 
fuels especially for automotive and small industry application). Depreciation on the 
other hand by speeding up exports could have sustained high imports of oil in 
keeping with the increased growth which itself could have been higher and sustained 
had the depreciation been carried out early enough. The depreciation when it came 
in 1986, was little, and a little too late to prevent the balance of payments crisis of 
the nineties. (Joshi and Little, 1996). Nevertheless in response to this belated 
depreciation exports had begun to  grow at 15% in US dollar terms since 1987.  
Emergence of Administered Prices 
Simultaneously, to address the question of volatility in prices of crude and oil and 
products the government set up the “Oil Pool Account” the purpose of which was to 
smooth the prices in the domestic economy. The idea was to hold prices low when 
international prices were high and to not let the retail local prices fall when the 
international prices were low, using the surpluses from the latter situation and an 
initial financial reserve to finance the former situation. The Oil Pool Account was not 
managed independently under a proper regulatory framework distanced from the   
government of the day. Thus beyond mitigating the effects of price spikes and sharp 
falls, the Oil Pool Account may have been used to moderate prices before elections, 
and for excessively long periods. The lack of regular adjustments in prices would only 
make the final adjustment when it had to be made all the more difficult.   
Tax Reform Misses the Petroleum Sector 
The stabilization and structural adjustment of the Indian economy was successful as 
can be  inferred by both the vast efficiency gains and the high growth the economy 
achieved. One important element of the structural reform was the reform of indirect 
taxes. Central excise taxes – the principal indirect taxes were in most industries cast 
on value added basis. MODVAT with taxes on output and tax credit on input was 
brought about. The items for which tax credit was allowed was increased to include 
depreciation on machinery.  And the central tax regime  soon became known as 
CENVAT. The only exception was in the case of oil and petroleum products which 
were still taxed on the basis of excise duties with no credit allowed to users of oil as  
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intermediate goods. Oil was the only significant exception. Reform of oil taxes was to 
be done later and in 2002 the APM was to go. Then as much as 25% of both central 
and state taxes depended upon oil. In 2002 there was partial reform of the APM with 
all products other than kerosene, diesel, petrol and LPG being allowed to be set by 
the oil companies, while these four were continued to be “administered”. The oil pool 
account as such was given up so the determination of these prices can at best be 
said to adhoc. Unlike in the case of all other products there was no commitment of 
the government that that the tax rates would converge to remove distortions in the 
use of various products.  
Similarly the subsequent attempts at moving away from what may be characterized 
as an ‘arbitrary pricing mechanism’ , strangely did not include casting oil under a 
value added tax regime. This is surprising since there is no way to recompense 
exporters for very high energy taxes (and prices) in India without such a value added 
tax in place.  
The response of the government to the recent oil price spike has been to pass on in 
an adhoc manner the costs of keeping the retail prices below costs including taxes, 
on to the companies, eroding their networth, and in part by adhoc write offs of the 
duties or reduction in the tax rates. The specious argument that the upstream 
companies, downstream companies and the government should take a third each of 
the burden of uncovered subsidies has been made in some of the pronouncements 
of the government on the issue. This completely violates the sanctity of the tax 
regime, introduces adhocism, and keeps the relationship between the oil companies 
and the government as far from arms length as can be imagined, and  with the all 
the distortions that such non-arms length relationships bring. It also de-facto keeps 
the private sector out of the retailing business, since they do not have access to such 
offsets in taxes that are implicitly made or to hopes of receipt on account of   
uncovered subsidies in the future. The need for a clear policy and mechanism to 
handle oil price spikes (the need for which while it cannot be justified on economic 
grounds can have a political basis) that does not distort the playing field between 
private and public players is most urgent. That is also required if the public sector oil 
companies are not to move further away from commercial orientation and efficient 
working, as they would under the current adhoc regime. 
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Pricing Today 
The Administered Pricing Mechanism (APM) was adopted in 1976 following the 
recommendations of the Oil Pricing Committee Report of 1975. The Oil Coordination 
Committee (OCC) was formed at the time to manage the procurement of crude, 
refining of crude, distribution of crude and operating the oil pool account. As said 
before the process came under increasing questioning after the economic 
liberalization picked up in earnest since the early nineties. It became clear that 
administered prices, based essentially on cost plus formula were making the oil 
industry inefficient and also discouraging much needed investments.  
After considerable dithering the government finally moved to a new regime on 
pricing or petroleum products from April 2002. The pricing of all the products other 
than motor spirit, high speed diesel, kerosene and LPG were to be determined by the 
market. The government would continue to determine the price of these four 
products. The philosophy of pricing would be to cross subsidize the price of kerosene 
and LPG (at least partially) by charging higher prices for the other two products. The 
government also framed ‘The Petroleum Regulatory Board Bill, 2002’ with a view to 
creating an independent Board to regulate the refining process, storage, 
transportation, distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum and petroleum products 
excluding production of crude oil and natural gas so as to, protect the interests of 
consumers and entities engaged in specified activities relating to petroleum and 
petroleum products, ensure uninterrupted and adequate supply of markets and for 
matter connected therewith or incident thereto.’ The Bill however was not converted 
into an Act since the then government was in its last year in office and therefore was 
unwilling to pursue conversion of the Bill into an Act.  
The relentless rise in the price of petroleum and petroleum products in the last few 
years has exposed the impracticality of government retaining its control over the 
pricing of petroleum products. The government’s inability to revise the prices 
upwards, partly due to concern about its possible impact on inflation and partly due 
to the opposition from the coalition parties supporting the government, has led to a 
situation whereby the government has had to provide for large amounts of funds to 
support the losses being incurred by the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs). As the 
prices rose, the government revenues also rose in sync, since duties were ad 
valorem.   
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Rangarajan Committee Report 
The government set up a Committee on Pricing and Taxation of Petroleum Products, 
February, 2006, under Chairmanship of Dr. C. Rangarajan. The recommendations of 
the Committee were based on the following principles: a) taxation should be 
rationalised to improve efficiency, b) petroleum product prices should be aligned to 
international prices, c) subsidy should be targeted to help BPL (Below Poverty Line) 
families and it should be transparently accounted for in the Union Budget, d) 
customs duties should be rationalised to ensure that domestic refineries are not at a 
disadvantage, e) excise duties should be rationalised to shield consumers from price 
volatility. 
•  The specific recommendations of the Committee were as follows: 
•  The prices of motor spirit and diesel to refineries should be the weighted average 
of import parity and export parity prices in the ratio of 80:20. This was based on 
the data that about 20% of refinery products are exported. 
•  The customs duty on motor spirit and diesel should be reduced to 7.5%, thereby 
reducing the protection to refineries.  
•  The government should allow oil marketing companies to fix the retail prices of 
motor spirit and diesel, subject, if necessary to ceilings. This would encourage 
competition. 
•  The principle of freight equalisation should be discontinued. The government may 
consider some other manner of mitigating the impact of this measure on remote 
areas. 
•  The ad valorem levies should be replaced with specific levies at the rate of Rs. 
5.00 per litre of diesel and Rs. 14.75 per litre of motor spirit. 
•  Subsidised kerosene should be available only to BPL families. 
•  The price of domestic LPG should be raised by Rs. 75 per cylinder (14.2 kg) and 
thereafter the price should be adjusted gradually to eliminate subsidy altogether.  
•  The subsidy sharing by upstream companies (ONGC, GAIL and OIL) should be 
discontinued and instead the OIDB cess collected from them should be increased 
to Rs. 4800 per tonne (from the present Rs. 1800 per tonne).  
•  The share of the subsidy to be borne by the government should be met through 
budget provision.  
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The thrust of the recommendations is clearly to bring in a regime where the prices of 
petroleum products are benchmarked to international prices, the taxes are 
rationalised to remove distortions, the industry is encouraged to become more 
efficient, the demand responds to changes in the international prices of products, the 
subsidies are capped and targeted properly and the burden of the subsidy is 
recognised today rather than being transferred to the future. The recommendations 
could not be accepted by the government for a variety of reasons. 
Nevertheless, even the Rangarajan Committee did not suggest a complete and clean 
break from the past to cast taxes purely on value added basis, and subsidies as 
direct subsidies, which alone would have removed the core distortions on account of 
adulteration, diversion, distortionary effect on the value chain, competition and 
exports. 
Chaturvedi Committee Report 
The Prime Minister constituted in 2008 The High Powered Committee on Financial 
Position of Oil Companies under Chairmanship of Mr. B.K. Chaturvedi to assess the 
implications of the severe negative impact of the petroleum products pricing policies 
of the government on the financial position of the Oil Marketing Companies between 
2004-5 and 2008 and recommend measures to deal with the situation. 
Acknowledging the need to take steps urgently to improve the cash flow situation of 
OMCs so that they are in a position to undertake the investments required to sustain 
long term growth and maintain efficiency of operations and product quality, the 
Committee recommended the following measures: 
•  The refinery gate price should be the fob export prices (to be revised every 
month on the basis of average prices for the month). 
•  The distribution and marketing expenses and the applicable Union taxes and 
duties should be added to the prices charged by the refineries to arrive at the 
retail selling prices. 
•  The refineries should be allowed to recover specific state taxes such as entry tax, 
octroi and CST from the OMCs and the OMCs in turn should be permitted to 
recover the same from the consumers of that state. 
•  The import duty on motor spirit and diesel should be eliminated (as in case of 
kerosene, LPG and crude). The excise duties on these products should be  
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simultaneously reduced and by March 2009, the domestic prices should reflect 
the prevailing international prices. 
•  Industrial consumers of diesel should be charged the full price of diesel with 
immediate effect. 
•  The subsidy on diesel to Railways and State Road Transport Corporations should 
also be rapidly done away with. 
•  A gradual monthly increase in price of motor spirit and diesel for retail consumers 
should be effected with immediate effect, till the market prices are reached. The 
proposed increase in price of MS should be Rs. 2 per litre and the increase in 
price of diesel should be Rs. 0.75 per litre.  
•  SKO should be made available at concessional rate only to BPL families. The 
subsidy should be delivered through smart cards or cash transfer and not 
through supply of kerosene at below fair market prices. 
•  The subsidy on domestic LPG should also be available only to BPL families in the 
long run. This subsidy too (as in case of kerosene) should be delivered through 
smart cards or cash transfer and not through supply at below fair market prices.  
•  Special Oil Tax should be levied on domestic producers of crude oil (on pre NELP 
leases). The tax will kick in if crude prices exceed $75 per barrel, at the rate of 
100% for ONGC and OIL and 40% for private producers. The tax is seen as 
temporary measure till the product prices adjust fully to international prices. 
 
It is quite evident that the Chaturvedi Committee too has in effect recommended 
that the process of arriving at the domestic prices of petroleum products should at 
the earliest possible start reflecting the prevailing international prices. This would 
ensure that the domestic industry becomes efficient and cost competitive and the 
economy responds to changes in the prices of products. The state should take care 
of the burden of high prices on BPL families through disbursement of subsidies 
directly to eligible families and not through distortionary controls on pricing of 
products.  
 
The Chaturvedi Committee still operated under the framework of pricing on parity 
which is essentially a regulation of the sector.  The point though is that true exit 
from any administration of prices and market determination would mean allowing the 
companies to freely price their product.  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 21 
Trade and Import Parity Pricing 
The four products that are under price control are Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed 
Diesel (HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) and Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG). These 
products account for about 70% of the output of refineries of the public sector Oil 
Marketing Companies (OMCs).  
The prices are administered at two levels:  
1.  At the refinery gate – this is the price at which products are sold to the 
marketing divisions of the OMCs. 
2.  At the level of the consumer – this is the price that consumers are required to 
pay for the products. 
The refinery gate prices for MS and HSD are what is called ‘Trade Parity Prices 
(TPPs)’; while the refinery gate prices for SKO and LPG are what is called ‘Import 
Parity Prices (IPPs)’ 
To arrive at these prices, it is necessary to understand other terms: 
The C.I.F. (cost insurance and freight) price is first determined on the basis of F.O.B. 
(free on board) charges and other associated costs for imports as follows: 
CIF = [FOB + Freight from the port of export to refinery port + Insurance] x 
(rupee/$)  
      + LC charges + Landing charges + customs duty 
The FOB rate is determined based on the rates prevailing in specified ports in the 
Gulf region. The freight rate is arrived at on the basis of the rates prevailing for MR 
(medium range, 45k tonne capacity) tankers (the rates are published by ‘World 
Scale’). The Rupee/$ rate is the RBI reference rate. The rates are revised every 
fortnight. 
The IPP is the same as the CIF arrived at as above and the EPP (export parity price) 
is nothing but the FOB. The TPP (trade parity price) is computed as follows: 
  TPP = 0.80 x IPP + 0.20 x EPP  
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For a costal refinery, the refinery gate prices for SKO and LPG are the respective 
IPPs and the refinery gate prices for MS and HSD are the respective EPPs.   
For an inland refinery, an element of freight is added.  
The refinery gate prices for SKO and LPG are arrived at as follows: 
  Refinery gate price = IPP + 75% of the rail freight from the port to refinery 
The refinery gate prices for MS and HSD are arrived at as follows: 
Refinery gate price = TPP + 75% of the rail freight from the port to refinery 
The port chosen is the one that is nearest to the refinery.   
The price that OMCs are entitled to charge, which may be called the entitled price is 
computed as follows: 
  Entitled price = refinery gate price + 50% or rail freight from refinery to 
depot + marketing costs + marketing margin 
The deficit or the under-recovery is the difference between the entitled price and the 
selling price: 
  Under-recovery = Entitled price – Selling price 
Sharing of Under-recoveries 
Last year the sharing was as follows: 
OMCs      24.0% 
Government     42.7%  (essentially,  the  balance) 
The proposed sharing this year is as follows: 
Upstream  companies      Rs.  45000  crore 
OMCs      Rs.  20000  crore 
Government       Rs.  95000  crore  
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The balance (if any) is as yet unmet and undecided. The government would make oil 
bonds available to the tune of its commitment to meet the under-recoveries. 
RBI’s Special Window for Oil Bonds 
The OMCs have started facing stiff resistance from buyers of Oil Bonds. The supply 
of these bonds has outstripped the demand. As a result, these bonds have to be sold 
at heavy discount. The cash strapped OMCs need cash to purchase crude to keep 
their business going. The RBI, for some time, implemented an arrangement to 
provide liquidity to the oil bonds. It started giving US Dollars in exchange for the 
bonds (valued using a notional yield) directly to the OMCs. The amount of oil bonds 
that RBI agreed to purchase in one day was restricted to Rs. 1500 crore. However, 
the facility has now been withdrawn. This had resulted in renewed cash crunch for 
the OMCs as they were saddled with non-tradable oil bonds.  
As oil prices fell and the government did not fully reduce the prices, the losses of the 
oil companies began to the covered. But the year 2008-09 closed with the oil 
companies showing significant uncovered subsidy. The Indianoil for the first time 
since its creation has shown losses in the year 2008-09.   
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 24 
SECTION III 
ISSUES IN OIL PRICING TODAY 
Politicization of Prices 
Oil pricing today is one of the politically most sensitive aspects of public policy today. 
Whether in reality true or not, most political parties believe that higher oil product 
prices would hurt their electoral prospects and raising oil prices creates opportunities 
for the opposition to mobilize support, and agitate against policies of the 
government.  Opposition parties typically would not let such opportunities go.  What 
is worse is the belief that market determined prices would take away political support 
for the party in power. It is not merely kerosene and LPG (both of which are widely 
believed to be consumed by the common man) that are under such political scrutiny 
but also diesel and petrol. The inclusion of petrol in the radar of the political parties 
is interesting since it was hitherto considered as a luxury product and not a “common 
man’s”.  The failure of public transport, and the resulting very large growth in private 
transport in the form of scooters and motorcycles among the lower middle classes 
creates the basis for populism with regards to petrol prices.  
Low Prices as the Method of Subsidisation 
The paradigm of using low prices rather than endowments to subsidise which is well 
entrenched among policy makers in India has meant that there is little awareness of 
possible other modes.  And opportunities for re-casting the price based subsidies as 
direct subsidies, freeing pricing to be determined by markets was missed, many 
times, and especially  when low international prices of petroleum products ruled, 
since the low prices allow a regime shift to be made with less difficulty. The 
opportunity to do so has again presented itself, since now global oil prices have 
started falling and the government must not miss the opportunity again. The 
recommendations that we make in this study have the potential to de-politicize the 
sector and actually create vast political goodwill if the measures especially for direct 
subsidization are put in place.   
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Distortions in the current regime
7 
The distortions in the current price based subsidisation are many and they stem from 
two root causes. One arises out of subsidisation being carried out through retail price 
maintenance, with prices that vary  significantly both across products (eg. as 
between petrol and diesel or diesel and kerosene) and across consumers for the 
same product (kerosene through PDS and open sale).  As argued below there are 
three levels of distortions.  Second  when differential taxes (positive and negative as 
in the case of products sold below import prices + transportation) are used so as not 
to leave  regulatory rents with the oil company, then necessarily the value added in 
the industry has to be either assessed or assumed.  This means unwarranted 
regulation and the distortions that such regulation brings. 
The higher priced product’s demand growth is slower than what it would otherwise 
have been. On the other hand the demand growth in the lower priced segment tends 
to much higher than what it would be otherwise be in an unrationed low price 
situation. 
This reduces the net taxes collected from the sector from what they would otherwise 
have been, and so reduces the scope for cross subsidising through differential 
taxation. While energy as a whole is price inelastic over the short to medium period, 
it is only so to the extent that income effects are ignored. In the long term though 
there is weak price elasticity and strong income elasticity for overall energy 
consumption. For particular products such as oil products within energy, and most 
importantly for one fuel in relation to another there is strong price elasticity. The 
effects are often masked by the overall income elasticity, and the relative price 
effects have to be inferred through complex multivariate  panel studies. These show 
significant substitution effects and slower growth of high priced fuels. 
Inefficient use of fuels result as when there is an attempt  by consumers to use the 
relatively low priced fuel to a greater extent than otherwise. Thus there is extensive 
diesel use in small engine applications –autorickshaws, cars and in electricity 
                                                  
7  For empirical evidence and detailed arguments for some of the contentions herein see 
Morris, Sebastian, Ajay Pandey and S.K. Barua (2006), and Pandey, Ajay , and Sebastian 
Morris (2006).  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 26 
generating sets and of kerosene in mobile and power applications.
8 This is so 
especially when the socially wasteful higher capital cost of using the low priced fuel 
is taken into account.  Additionally, the environmental effects, engine life loss effects 
could be significant as when inappropriate fuels are used. 
To restrict the consumption of fuels which are very low priced –LPG and kerosene 
rationing arises naturally. The cost of rationing is socially wasteful and these rise as 
the degree of rationing increases in response to the dual pricing in the very fuel, and 
as the price difference between the same and substitutes increase. Thus rationing 
becomes  necessary in the case of kerosene since for poor consumers the price is 
low (around Rs. 8-10) whereas for others (white kerosene) it is high (Rs. 36-40).  
This differential now creates problems:  First is the already mentioned unnecessarily 
incurred social cost. The cost will be high since under rationing parallel distribution 
networks which with very low and occasional throughput would have to be created 
and maintained. 
More importantly response to the divergent prices open arbitrage opportunities arise 
against which the only seeming option is increased vigilance and policing. Thus 
diversion of kerosene from the poor to other unintended consumers, and even worse 
the use of such kerosene for adulteration of diesel as a practice emerges. The fiscal 
losses are humongous. Equally  importantly the social losses on account of reduced 
engine life, copying strategies and pollution are enormous.  
                                                  
8 Some policy makers attempt to justify the administered higher prices of diesel over petrol 
by presuming that diesel is used in public transport and petrol in more private and para-
transport. While this may have been true at the start of the differential price regime, the fact 
is today the use of diesel in private cars and taxis  is high. Indeed while the diesel  to petrol 
cars numbers would be 1 to 3 in favour of petrol cars, since diesel cars are used more (the 
rule of thumb being buy and use diesel cars when the average annual usage is more than 
10,000 km) than petrol cars the total vehicle-kms would be more evenly distributed between 
petrol and diesel. Trucks would anyway have chosen diesel given diesels superior 
performance in heavy engines, but having lower prices for them does in no way benefit the 
industry as such since being completely competitive, (efficient) input costs would be pass 
thru.  Another  aspect, that diesel typically has higher fuel efficiency while true, at smaller 
engine sizes this advantage has to work against higher cost and higher engine weights. 
Similarly both diesel engine weights (power to weight ratios) have been falling, while the fuel 
and emission efficiency of petrol engines rising with direct injection and multivalve /variable 
timing technology. The more important argument that taxes should not affect the technology 
and input choices of the economy supersedes other arguments, since technology 
characteristics change and governments should not be in the business of predicting or 
influencing these decisions. Only externalities need address through differential taxation. 
Thus in a non-distortionary fuel pricing scheme, small engine applications would have been 
petrol, cars a mix of both and trucks diesel, and trucks diesel.  
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Engendering Poor Governance  
There are even third order effects as when in response to these distortions, the 
governance structure in oil distribution and retailing is badly affected and corruption 
is entrenched. Fighting the same only compounds the problem since the additional 
cost of fighting which itself is socially unnecessary and therefore wasteful are also 
large. Control is lost in distribution as an activity, and the oil distribution business 
instead of generating profits, generate rents which attracts politicians to intervene 
embedding rent seeking in society. Thus oil retailing and gas distribution as   
businesses have to be administratively allocated and managed and the social waste 
as a result are very large. This is exemplified by the existence and working of the 
Dealer Selection Board and the vast pressures they bring on the oil companies to 
award retail businesses to particular groups and individuals. Valuable managerial and 
administrative energies are lost in fighting corruption and adulteration, even if the 
same are overcome. It is more likely that barring a few points of high visibility and 
consumption by the elite, adulteration and short filling in a managed sort of way 
continues elsewhere and is the best possible result under this overarching distortion 
of price based subsidisation. 
Since adulteration and short filling allows oil retailers with small turnovers to coexist 
with others with large turnover who may not be adulterating, the very data on retail 
sales in making the locational choices is problematic. Also the average throughput 
per RO is very low in India, and that means that socially wasteful expenditure is 
being incurred in oil retailing. 
Opportunities also emerge to develop socially wasteful technologies such as special 
additives to use LDO /kerosene –diesel mixture in diesel engines, naphtha in petrol 
engines etc. The latter means use of benzenes as an additive whose carcinogenic 
values in contact with humans in many times higher than that of linear 
hydrocarbons. It is likely that this use of benzenes to stabilise the use of naphtha as 
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Vast Directly Unproductive Activities Supported 
Similarly since liquid fuels can always be adulterated, environmentalists, to fight 
pollution resulting from adulteration, force upon the system gaseous fuels, since 
these are believed to be beyond adulteration. The very high social cost of using 
gaseous fuels in relation to liquid fuels – LSHSD and Euro –III /IV norms for engines, 
then becomes necessary as has happened in the case of Delhi.  
The fight against adulteration in this situation of differential prices (in the case of 
kerosene for instance) has reached “heightened levels” of using markers in PDS 
k e r o s e n e  s o  t h a t  P D S  k e r o s e n e   i f  u s e d  i n  a d u l t e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  f u e l s  a n d  w h i t e  
kerosene (non subsidised kerosene) can be detected. Such an approach to manage 
even while arbitrage price differences continue necessarily means that large numbers 
of samples would have to be regularly collected and tested. They would involve 
entirely avoidable and very large monitoring costs.   They also involve the costs of 
trucks dedicated to kerosene transport, a parallel distribution system which is 
engaged only once in 15 days.  Theoretically such socially wasteful activities – or 
directly unproductive activities (DUPs) as they have been called by Jagdish Bhagwati, 
would amount to a substantial part of the rent in adulteration, to be able to 
overcome the problem of adulteration. This presumes that the markers cannot be 
neutralised. That markers could be neutralised was easy to have been visualised. 
The recent evidence of the same proves that markers have not worked since all that 
the adulterating industry had to do was to find methods to remove the marker from 
kerosene!
9  
Thus the complex responses when price based subsidisation is in place for, long 
result in very large social costs being borne and rents being generated and 
governance being adversely affected. 
It is very difficult to estimate the impact on consumption including consumption 
distortions that result from administered pricing.   
 
                                                  
9 Cf. Amitava Ranjan, “Tamper Proof Kerosene – There’s proof that it can be tampered”, 
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Trade Patterns 
Table 2 brings out the gross and net trade in petroleum products in relation to 
consumption. Observe that for naphtha, fuel oil, and other products the gross trade 
is very high in relation to the net trade and this is arising on account of the cross 
hauling across the country’s borders due to both the older refineries in being able to 
handle domestic crude and also because of the distortions that have not allowed 
private players the space in distribution (since they would then have to be subsidised 
under retail price maintenance) forcing them to export more of their product than 
what they would have desired, while others import product to serve the domestic 
market under the current pricing regime. Also there is a very large export of naphtha  
and MS from India since the demand is relatively higher for diesel and not for MS,  
necessitates  the use of naphtha in thermal applications or its export. (Naphtha can 
be considered as stock requiring further processing to make into MS). Also observe 
that the export realisation prices of MS, naphtha, ATF,  and diesel are not too 
dissimilar. 
The need to export and import naphtha arises both on account of  surplus of this 
lighter distillate (due to higher overall demand for diesel –due in turn to the lower 
prices of diesel vis-à-vis petrol) as also due to the fact that local industries’   
requirement of naphtha is  largely of a kind that is not produced in India. The export 
of petrol is also on account of  surplus engendered by retail price distortion. 
Similarly, due to surplus refining capacity HSD which earlier was imported to meet 
the higher relative demand is now exported in significant amounts. Petroleum 
products have had the highest growth rate in exports since 2001, and there are no 
obvious reasons (other than distortions) for this seeming revealed “comparative 
advantage”. 
Revealed Distortions in Consumption 
Figure 2 brings out the implicit deflator in a number of items of private final 
consumption expenditure including all of private final consumption expenditure.   
These are based on NAS Private Final Consumption Expenditure data at current and 
constant prices and dividing one by the other. These are items of PFCE available at 
the most detailed level of disaggregation in the NAS. Observe that PFCE deflator has 
been very close to the food beverage and tobacco deflator. More importantly the  
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large swings in the deflator for LPG, kerosene and electricity induced by essentially 
administrative pricing may be seen. See also the sudden rises that the administrative 
prices impose upon society.  Since the early 80s the prices of the subsidised products 
have behaved as expected. Being the log of the implict delfators the slopes indicate 
the inflation. Thus inflation was high following the oil price shock. 
Figure 3 brings out the “Theil Measure” for consumption across a the variety of fuels. 
The “Theil Measure” is a measure of entropy and higher values indicate periods 
when there is rapid substitution across the components in this case fuels and 
energy
10. Thus the measure has been high since the oil crisis and the differential 
pricing of fuels and the since the institution of price based subsidisation in the sector. 
Thus there is a degree of unwarranted uncertainty in terms of consumption of fuels, 
even though the entire rise in the “Theil Measure” cannot be attributed to pricing 
alone. Per capita income rise which was rapid from 1980 and  the poor performance 
of public transport brought about the two wheeler revolution which would have had 
some impact.  But since the “Theil Measure” for overall consumption has increased 
less proportionately (See figure 4) the role of administered pricing is likely to be 
quite significant. This is also shown by figure 5 wherein on notices that the growth 
rates in the private final consumption expenditures  of kerosene and LPG have varied 
much more than PFCE and especially so since  the administered price mechanism 
was put in place.  
Commercial Orientation of Industry is Problematic 
Price based subsidisation also means that if there are truly profit maximising 
commercial entities – such as private sector firms – then a moral hazard situation is 
created for them. Consider for instance, the possible case of a private sector in 
refining and oil distribution.  Without detailed examination of every consignment 
from a refinery it is not possible to accurately measure the amount of diesel, petrol, 
naphtha, kerosene etc. that is produced.  Since taxes on some fuels are lower than 
on others it creates a situation on moral hazard in that the enterprise can gain 
                                                  
10 The “Theil Measure” can be defined as :  ∑ ⋅ − − =
i
i i t S t S T ) ( )) ) 1 ( (ln( ; where  i S is the 
share of the i
th fuel in total expenditure, and t is the time period. It measures the structural 
change taking place in terms of the share of consumption. Thus when the shares change the 
theil measure would show an increase in the value. When they are unchanging the theil 
measure would be small indicating stasis.  
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substantially by under reporting the higher taxed fuel and over reporting the 
production of under taxed fuel.  There is no way retail sales data across the very 
large number of retail outlets can be collected to verify the quantum of  fuels export 
since an over statement of imports would allow the private company to realise rents 
on taxes collected at the retail level but not paid to the government, if the company 
can overstate its exports.  Thus there is an open opportunity for tax ‘arbitrage’ which 
is a situation of moral hazard.   In the case of the public sector firms since one could 
possibly argue that they are not motivated by profits alone, a certain situation of 
arbitrage could be left unexploited.
11 Therefore price based subsidisation acts to 
prevent liberalisation of the sector and a commercial orientation from emerging.  
Administrative Roles Get Reinforced 
Differential excise means that the prices in India for product have to be 
administratively determined since the taxes are not on value added basis and the 
distribution of products over the total output of the refinery is necessary to assess 
the taxes due from each of the commercial entities in the sector. This leads to 
administrated prices with all the difficulties that it brings as a necessary feature. As 
said before, it also means that the government has to have firm records of the 
details of the products sold/ produced to be able to asses the taxes. There is a very 
large moral hazard problem that private refining and marketing firms would face 
since they could gain much by underreporting the throughput /sales of the product 
with higher taxes, as said before.  Additionally it brings with it the need for 
regulation of the petroleum sector when none is justified on first principles. 
                                                  
11 It is exploited by the retail outlets.  
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SECTION IV 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR OIL 
The Subsectors 
The petroleum sector may be considered as having the distinct segments - oil 
extraction, oil refinery, oil distribution, and oil transport through ships, trucks, oil 
tankers and other vessels and through use of pipelines.  Natural monopoly obtains 
only in the transport of oil through pipelines and by rail tankers.  Movement by rail 
tankers are to be regulated as part of the regulation of railways.  It is only the 
pipeline business which is the part of the sector that needs regulation.  The business 
of transportation by other means is quite competitive and is never to be regulated.  
Oil extraction because of the role of access to natural resources, results in some 
firms with large market power and as such oligopoly is the norm in this business.  
Nevertheless this aspect cannot be considered as resulting in a  natural monopoly 
needing to be corrected by price regulation.  Herein for countries without such 
access, strategic initiative to create firms with countervailing power, buying oil assets 
abroad, developing and procuring other sources such as gas would be the examples 
of the correct initiatives.  
Forced Regulation of Distribution 
But when import parity/trade parity prices constitute the mechanism of pricing rather 
than markets, then there is defacto price regulation of both refining and distribution 
business.  Thus under import parity the refinery gate prices is the imported cost 
(CIF) + inland transport cost indexed to 75% of the rail freight from port to refinery.  
The administered price of rail freight therefore enters into the picture.  Since this is 
an area of natural monopoly, there is little distortion in such pricing.  Ostensibly at 
75% of rail freight the provided cost for transportation of bulk material covers the 
cost of transportation via pipelines, leaving the mode risk, scale decision etc. to the 
business.  The ill features in this pricing are as : 
1)  The railways being not independently regulated there is perverse incentive on 
the part of the Railway Ministry to raise tariffs in oil transport keeping it just so high 
as to remove the incentives to go in for road except for very short distances.  Bulk of 
the difference in cost between rail thus priced and road would be mopped up by the  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 33 
railways.  Additionally the Railways with such rent opportunity would try to pressure 
the oil companies from investing in pipelines. 
2)  More importantly the prices in India for all petroleum products are necessarily 
linked to prices in the reference market (Middle East).  Product markets are known to 
be thinner than crude markets and fragmented locally, depending upon local refinery 
capacities, taxes
12, demand patterns, besides local support.  Thus in having import 
parity prices, there is an artificial movement away from what the market prices in 
India would have been.  In other words, there is an imposed 100% linkage of the 
Indian market to the reference market.  As the Indian consumption and market 
becomes significant in the region east of the Suez (and excluding East Asia)  the 
Indian market’s influence on global prices would be attenuated and instead the 
influence would be exclusively in one direction. It could in the near future amount to 
linking a larger market to prices in a smaller or thinner market.  Some product prices 
are expected to be lower in India, relative to South East Asia since India has 
significant refining capacity.  In other words it forcibly links the prices in India  to the 
prices as obtained in the reference country, whereas prices in a competitive situation 
are market determined with significant variations across regions even when all 
movement is free and there are no taxes. 
3)  Perhaps most damaging is the feature that to move from “refining prices” to 
retail prices, the administrator has to regulate the cost of distribution.  While the tax 
and levies cost of distribution are determined very simply, in determining the cost of 
distribution, the administrator is regulating an important component of the sector.  
Today the cost of distribution (called marketing cost and marketing margin) as 
determined is a norm.  To the extend that it is a norm and not based on actuals, 
there is some incentive to reduce costs.  However since these norms are themselves 
backward looking, being based on past data there is a tendency to not compete to 
reduce the cost and margin.  Most importantly, this is an area where the play of 
markets and competition must reign but  today, under the import /trade parity 
regime is  being muted by the created need to regulate. This arises out of the need 
for retail price maintenance via  differential taxes which in turn arises out of the 
paradigm of price based subsidies. 
 
                                                  
12 Taxes because they change the final retail prices affect the price elasticity and therefore 
the demand patterns.  
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Weak Incentive Effects 
Seemingly the movement to import parity prices and now trade parity prices has 
b e e n  a n  i m p r o v e m e n t .  I t  i s  s o  o n l y  t o  the extent that it brings about a limited 
contestability since conceivably the large users at least could import the product and 
pay the taxes in case the oil companies overcharge them. While this is possible for 
large importers with their own large transportation and bulk distribution assets – 
pipelines, tankers, storage etc – in reality even for them the contestability in the 
sector is limited since these assets are specific and therefore the barriers to entry are 
considerable.  More than contestability from outside industry players, the competition 
within the industry is the key to ensuring the right prices. While import parity pricing 
is better than the one based on costs as incurred by Indian oil players (entirely cost 
plus) it is important to realise as argued earlier that import parity is actually cost plus 
on value added in the distribution and retailing, while being pass thru on inputs (or 
notional inputs for distribution and retailing). The add on to import prices based on 
standard margins (which are driven by industry averages and past costs) provides 
only weak incentives to lower costs of distribution and retailing. They are no 
significant incentives to use new technologies to lower costs. Trade parity is merely 
the average of import and export parity as explained before and does not really bring 
the competitive pressure of the market on the distribution value added while weakly 
bringing in some pressure on refining. 
Competition and Competitiveness are Badly Affected 
More importantly the pricing regime does not result in free pricing between the 
products since the final retail prices are determined by the taxes and the subsidies 
and as such companies cannot derive their prices from overall profit maximisation in 
a situation of joint cost. As such the prices are non-responsive to the varying price 
elasticities across fuels, and competition is muted.  
The movement from import parity to trade parity is an “improvement” only in the 
sense that it recognises the possibility that refining firms could export their product 
and as such under this pricing the refinery gate are adjusted downwards by the 
“assumption” of an overall export of 20% of petroleum products produced in India is 
exported. Thus the formula itself being based on an outcome is backward looking  
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and would have to be changed then the export proportions change. It is not fair to 
refiners who do not export at all. 
One of the results of the current pricing regime is that it has resulted in large 
unnecessary and socially wasteful exports (and imports) from the country. The 
industry exports product and imports product and crude not merely to optimise the 
different crude processing flexibilities of refineries but also because of the distortions 
in the pricing regime which makes it profitable for the industry as a whole to do so. 
Indeed if the public sector refining industry had been purely commercially oriented 
they too would have preferred to export product rather than sell at a loss in India 
when retail prices through ad-hoc administrative action were held below cost 
including taxes. 
The fact that the pricing regime in creating a very large demand for LPG and HSD in 
relation to MS creates also the problem of surplus of MS, naphtha which then has to 
be exported out or used in lower value applications. Similarly, the import of LPG and 
HSD is necessary since there are limits to how much the thruput of refineries can be 
tweaked to increase the output of LPG and HSD. 
Besides subsidisation through relative prices, the government has been virtually 
determining the prices of product on a day to day basis and thereby violating its own 
trade parity prices. Its response to the oil price hike has been to hold retail prices at 
low levels (from what the trade parity prices would imply) and to force upon the oil 
companies some part of the uncovered subsidies. While the state owned enterprises 
bear these losses, it is a major loss to the minority share holders of these companies, 
and government should not be doing the same without a formal policy or agreement 
which the capital markets can correctly factor in. In this case the SOEs can perhaps 
have no option but to continue with these adhoc pricing. Being state owned they 
could hope for higher than import parity prices in situations when the international 
oil prices fall, or when government chooses to award them higher than import parity 
prices. This is worse than the what was the case under the administered price 
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Not Level Playing Field 
On private refining and distribution  such adhoc retail price determination can be 
disastrous. Thus when retail prices were held below costs and taxes as in the recent 
period when oil prices rose globally the private players Reliance and Essar had to 
shut their retailing business with vast national assets in retailing that had been built 
up going waste, and forcing upon the companies socially wasteful exports. 
Perhaps the most important ill resulting out of price based subsidisation are the 
distortions resulting in adulteration and the governance failure all of which together 
makes the cost of petroleum operations far higher than what they need be and take 
way consumer value in a very large way. 
Another major distortion, that is hardly eve r  r e c o g n i s e d ,  i s  t h a t  i n  h a v i n g  h i g h e r  
energy prices that are not offset through tax (excise) credit, manufacturing industry 
in India faces a significant handicap in competing with East Asian firms not only in 
the  international market but in the home market.  Besides relatively overvalued 
exchange rates (Morris, S. 1997,2001) , this is one of the important reasons for the 
hollowing out of Indian manufacturing. 
Specific duties have emerged as a vehicle to tax products like MS under the 
consideration that this unlike advalorem excise duties would not make the tax 
collections highly sensitive to global petroleum prices. Advalorem taxes though would 
amplify the the fall and rise in prices for consumers.  The very large anti competitive 
effects of specific duties are ignored in this position.   Thus the competitive 
advantage of a player with merely half the refinery and distribution cost (excluding 
fuel costs) is whittled down by the specific duties which would not allow him to sell 
petrol at a low enough price, since the value added in the refining business is low no 
more than 10%.  With value added taxes, since value added is only weakly 
dependent upon input prices, value added taxes give the benefit of being 
competitive, non-distortionary in other respects and at the same time not amplifying 
tax collections by government, when crude prices rise.  
SECTION V 
ESTIMATING THE REVENUE NEUTRAL VALUE ADDED TAX RATE IN THE 
PETROLEUM SECTOR 
In what follows we estimate the indirect taxes per unit of output or litre of product 
consumed in the country and what is of relevance to government and the policy 
makers in relation to the value added in the sector. 
Table 3  brings out the central indirect taxes (excise and customs duty) per tonne of 
crude and crude equivalent of product worked as Product/(1-crude loss factor).  It 
shows that the taxes realised on account of excise duty  was about Rs. 3700 per 
tonne of crude; i.e. roughly about Rs. 3.0 per litre of crude or its equivalent 
(assuming an average specific gravity of crude at 0.8). So a revenue neutral excise 
tax rate (given these figures) would have to generate a net excise collection of Rs. 
3.0 per litre of products sold or Rs. 3.7 per kg of product sold. The figures of tax 
revenues have been taken from the company data as reported by the Chaturvedi 
Committee and the relevant output figures from the PNG Statistics. 
Table 4 is based on company accounts as reported in the Prowess Data Base of the 
CMIE. Individual company data was downloaded to construct the value added and 
indirect taxes and components and then added across the sets of companies 
described in the notes to the table. Two measures of value added can be arrived at 
based on adding economic incomes generated and on subtracting from output value 
the purchased input values. Both are gross value added measures.  It is likely that 
the second measure of value added is more reliable since this would be affected only 
by the impact of non-operations but the first measure while not affected by non-
operating items would be affected by the details of classification of expenditure. 
Being not based on a clear economic and functional classification it is not possible to 
classify each item of cost whether it arises on account of purchased inputs or 
otherwise.  Note that the indirect taxes  amount to as much as 137% of value added 
for the public sector oil refining and distribution companies.  For the oil production 
companies in the public sector and for the private sector (most of which are in oil 
production) the taxes are smaller in relation to value added. Using the second 
measure of value added for the public sector oil refining and marketing companies 
they are as high as 254%.  
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Table 5 is based on aggregation across all mfg and petroleum sector companies 
carried through CMIEs Economic Information Services. Indirect business taxes (IBT) 
herein includes essentially excise and net sales taxes. They are in the range of 150% 
for the oil sector firms as a whole. And for all mfg in the range of 58 to 70%. Thus 
the petroleum taxes are quite severe on the sector in relation to the mfg sector as a 
whole (which includes the sector). Removing the effect of petroleum sector it is in 
the range of 30 to 56%.  Thus in the rest of mfg despite the IBT having gone on the 
value added basis  the taxes remain onerous since there are many sectors like 
cigarette, liquor and other sectors which are heavily taxed. It is presumed that the 
tax credit had been removed in the data and routines of the EIS.  
Table 6 attempts again to compute the indirect taxes in relation to value added but 
now using the Annual Survey of Industries for output and value added (items 17 to 
21) and  but for taxes using the Company Data on taxes paid as reported in Infraline 
Database (Oil and Natural Gas) by the oil companies.  It gives an indirect taxes 
/value added of around 160% for the central taxes (excluding customs duty) and 
150% for state taxes (presumably net) for the year 2005-06. Since then the same 
would have come down marginally to about 130-140% on value added. 
The same data as in table 5 is plotted for an extended period in  Figure 6. Even if 
there can be doubts on the accuracy of the value added rate of taxes, this is not 
likely to affect the relative movements. It shows that the value added rates of taxes 
for manufacturing as a whole have varied some what and to quite an extent 
propelled by the taxes in the petroleum sector. The period of recession in India 
which had started a little before the East Asian currency crisis, also corresponds to 
high taxes in relation to  value added  on petroleum products. The onset of high 
growth is also marked by a fall in the taxes since 2003 for at least two years before it 
grew. Growth fluctuations and the business cycles are better explained by demand 
variations brought about by variations in public spending, world demand and 
exchange rates driving exports, and agricultural demand driven exogenously by 
rainfall. The supply side is of little importance. But the supply side (petroleum prices 
in the local market and other primary goods prices especially of agriculture and other 
imported commodities) have been important in explaining inflation in the country. 
(Cf. Morris, Sebastian 1997; Morris, 2005). Therefore the distortions brought about 
by unvatted advalorem excise duties are quite significant in amplifying the price  
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movements in the economy as a whole and that is another reason why  taxes need 
to go on a value added advalorem basis. Figure 7 also brings out the well known fact 
of the hollowing out of manufacturing in India (as indicated by the increasingly 
(negative) ratio of net forex by the value added. The oil sector of course as is well 
known has a very high import dependency reflected in the net forex on account of 
trade being as much as 4 to 6 times the total value added in the sector. 
We also look up the price build up data as in table 7 for petrol and diesel to arrive at 
the tax as it exists on value added in distribution alone. The data is from the 
collations of the Infraline as indicated.  Observe that the total indirect tax (vatted 
sales tax and excise) when worked as on the distribution value added (assumed to 
be the marketing cost, marketing margin,  return on capital and dealer commission) 
is as high as 740% in the case of petrol and 320% in the case of diesel c.2008 in the 
Delhi area. This means that for petrol the advantage that a competitive distributor 
could have by lowering his distribution costs would be smothered by very high taxes.  
The value added tax basis has the advantage that the tax on refining, production, 
and distribution would be uniform (on a value added basis) and therefore neutral to 
competition and the degree of vertical integration.  
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SECTION VI 
THE FIRST BEST OPTION 
The first best option would be to opt for complete price deregulation of the sector 
with subsidies being delivered as direct subsidies and therefore market determined 
prices.  
The elements of deregulation are as follows: 
All central taxes except import duties – excise duties, specific excise duties, special 
taxes – are put on a value added tax bases. Given the analyses earlier in Section V., 
this value added revenue neutral rate would be 110-120 % on value added for the 
sector as a whole.  Revenue neutrality has been  ensured by working out a value 
added rate which is revenue neutral.  And subsidies are recast as direct 
endowments.   
Value Added Taxes 
The value added tax rate  can be linked out rather easily as 
V=CurrentTaxesRealised / ValueAddedInSector 
All of the oil sectors - refining, oil extraction, oil distribution, lubricants manufacture, 
oil transportation, bottling of LPG, storage and pipelines, trading in crude and 
petroleum products - ought to be included but not the petrochemicals sectors. For 
the current taxes realised the taxes paid by the very same sectors plus the possible 
claims of on account of tax credit due to the use of petroleum products by other 
sectors should be included. Based on our analysis a rate of 100-120% is believed to 
be revenue neutral. However this rate can be worked out more accurately with finer 
data from the players in the industry although for policy making it is not important. 
The approximate value of 110-120% is quite  good enough to be near neutral. 
This value added rate would work on all petroleum products irrespective of the 
nature and use of the product. Thus the rate would be independent of the product  
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mix, and the depth of value added, would be neutral as between upstream and 
downstream operations, the degree of outsourcing etc.
13 
The value added tax can be operationalised as a tax on output at v and a tax credit 
on input at v the way the CENVAT operates for all other products where v is the 
value added tax rate. 
The trucking, taxi  and transport  industry practices as well as the accounting and 
reporting by small businesses is not good enough for value added principles to be 
applied to the industrial /service use of oil products. There are two kinds problems:  
If all service tax/excise registered entities are allowed tax credit on fuel input use tax 
compliance and the value added principle can be strengthened. But the converse 
issue is that since there are many small truck, bus and taxi operators, final 
consumption demand can also perversely be reported as intermediate use as when 
entrepreneurs and employees of companies could use their company registration to 
get tax credit on their purchase of fuel for personal use of their automobiles. 
Similarly small taxi operators would have to maintain accounts and receipts to claim 
tax credit and that would impose much cost on both the operators and on the tax 
department.  In other words to give tax credit to all intermediate users of petroleum 
products would not be feasible since it would involve high transaction costs. 
Hence it is better to keep petrol and diesel out of tax credit for all including in 
intermediate applications. LPG and kerosene used in industrial applications can be 
                                                  
13  It can be contented that governments must retain the right to use taxes to influence 
consumption. That right can never be questioned but a liberal wiser regime of taxation would 
exercise this right minimally.  To influence consumption in a very distortionary and 
unintended way (as is the case with petroleum taxes)  would go against the spirit of a liberal 
economy. The tenets of good taxation demand that the tax system does not distort 
consumption, production, input use and technology choice, not to speak of not bringing about 
governance problems and corruption. This was the guiding principle  of the tax reform ever 
since excise taxes, following the Tax Reform Committee’s recommendations, a process that 
has been going on  and continues with the agenda of the GST (Goods and Services Tax). 
Most countries have moved away from using tax to influence consumption except at the 
margin, strategically and against the so called sin products –alcohol, tobacco etc. Even if  the 
logic of higher taxes on petroleum products vis-à-vis gas and coal (given that the domestic 
availability of these is higher) is granted , there can be no reason other than the status quo 
to justify the vastly different taxes on products within the petroleum sector that results in 
humongous fiscal losses, social costs, diversion and adulteration, and corruption and 
governance problems that take away a large part of the energies of the oil distribution 
companies. That one need to subsidise some users of kerosene or LPG is no argument to 
continue with this highly distortionary system since there are cleaner ways of giving subsidy.  
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allowed for tax credit by registered users of both products within the licensed limits 
which may be  reviewed every two years by the excise department at one or two 
levels higher than the operational office. Although naphtha is not a final use good by 
consumers, in order to prevent any misuse of naphtha (to adulterate petrol) it is also 
recommended that naphtha like LPG be made non-vatable except for registered 
users.  
All oil industry users of petrol and diesel (as when they buy from refineries or import 
the same) to sell/resell would have automatic tax credit on inputs of petrol and diesel 
(in addition to  naphtha, kerosene and other oil products) 
Treatment of Trucking and Small Productive Users 
Thus except for all intermediate users of all oil products oil product purchases are 
not vatable. Registered users would be: 
•  Oil industry – for all products 
•  Registered excise paying industry (who would also be paying sales tax)– all 
products except diesel, lubricants and petrol. 
For consumers, taxi operators, truckers and bus companies, farmers using LDO or 
diesel – no tax credit on use of any fuel including of petrol, lubricants and diesel. 
Import duties petroleum products and on crude would not be vatable; but excise 
duties (countervailing duties) paid on crude and petroleum products imports would 
be on the same basis as for excise duties on produced goods. 
Excise rates on all products are uniform at v. 
Import duties on all petroleum products and on crude are at the same uniform rate 
of no more than 8%. 8% is good enough to provide protection to the refining 
industry. At 8% duty on products and on crude the effective and nominal protection 
rate would be close to each other and at nearly 8% (assuming that the average 
protection rate today is close to 8%)
14. In general since no discrimination is desirable 
                                                  
14 Effective protection is defined as the ratio of value added at domestic prices  by the value 
added at international prices.  Assuming that prices in the country equal the international 
prices plus the customs duty rate, and there are no non-tradable inputs  (which in the case of 
oil industry is not a major limiting assumption) the EPR  can be defined as:  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 43 
either in favour of petroleum or against it the average rate of tariff on imports (of 
manufactures and non-agricultural products) should be the upper bound on 
petroleum products and crude.  8% is additionally justified on the basis of an optimal 
tariff argument since we cannot make the “small country assumption” with regard to 
India in its aspect as an importer of petroleum and products. 
Oil companies – upstream and downstream would have the complete freedom to set 
their prices. Both competition within the industry among the oil retailers and import 
competition would set automatic limits to the prices, and price discovery would take 
place in a non-distortionary manner. 
15 
Expected Retail Prices Under Competition 
The expected retail prices for oil products would be close to each other and would be 
governed by costs and taxes as follows: 
Average Price of Product = (1 + insurance and freight)(1+ import duty) International 
price of crude(Rs./Litre) * (1 - refinery loss) (1 + value added in refinery)(1 + value 
added in distribution and retailing) for an RO located close to the coast, and being 
served by refinery located nearby and using imported crude. 
The retail prices of individual product would of course vary around the average 
depending upon the substitution possibilities, the price elasticities of demand and 
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Where  j i t ,  is the ad-valorem customs duty on the i
th output or j
th input, and 
I
j i P,  is the 
international price of the  i
th output or j
th input.   ij w  is the input output coefficient in 
production. If therefore  t t t j i = = for all inputs and outputs, then the effective protection 
rate is the nominal protection rate, i.e.,  NPR t EPR = + = ) 1 ( . 
15 Currently the  customs duty on crude is nil, while on petroleum products (other than 
kerosene) it is around 3% giving approximately an effective protection of around 15-30% if 
the value added can be assumed to be no higher than 20%.  Moving to 8% customs duty 
need not raise the final price of petroleum products on an average to the customer if the 
proposed value added taxes at 110 to 120% can be adjusted. Indeed the revenue neutral 
rate would also be approximately neutral to the average customer prices if the second order 
effects (arising on account of demand being affected) can be ignored. This assumption is 
usual in making revenue neutral estimates.   
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such other factors. There is no reason why the relative prices should not mirror those 
internationally with FO/LSHS being low per tonne, and the core products being in a 
narrow band. In India,  (as in countries without distortionary taxes /administered 
prices) based on our estimates  (Pandey, Ajay and Sebastian Morris, 2006) of price 
elasticity of petrol (being greater than 1) and of diesel (slightly lower than 1), petrol 
would then reach marginally lower prices than diesel and kerosene. 
The value added in refining and value added in distribution and retailing are 
competitively determined.  Similarly, the refinery loss would be driven down as far as 
possible through both better operations and technology choice, once competition in 
the market emerges and is allowed to be determined by, and determine, competition 
for the market. 
In what follows we work out the refinery loss factor (or the product yield factor= 1- 
refinery loss factor) and the value added in refining ( or the refinery margin). 
Table 8 works out the revealed crude conversion ratio in India given the total crude 
inflow and the product produced. This has ranged from  nearly 0.90 to 0.93. This 
calculation does not include the stock changes. Ideally the crude absorbed – Change 
in stocks has to be used. Since stock figures for crude was not readily available, the 
approximate measure is arrived at. For regulation this means a crude loss factor of 
around 10-7% say 8%. There has been a marginal improvement (fall in this loss 
factor) with technical improvements on the average refining capacity. 
Table 9 brings out the average price realisation in exports of products and of crude 
imports by Indian refiners. It works out the implicit refinery margin  based on  the 
weighted average dollar price realisation of Indian products  given Indian mixes of 
product. This can be used to compute approximately the refinery margin in India as 
revealed implicitly. The implicit margin as revealed is the value of the output of 
refineries at international prices divided by the cost of the same amount of crude 
required to produce a tonne of product (calculated using the refinery loss factor of 
table 8). The refinery loss factor is assumed at 10%. Thus the refinery margin has 
ranged from -2.9% to  15.2%. The crack spread too though more crudely is an index 
that tracks refinery margins which is in Dollars per barrel. The crack spread over the 
same period ranged from $ 3 to 27 per barrel as crude prices rose to $ 130 per 
barrel. See Figure 3.  In $ per barrel the implicit spread for Indian refining was as  
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given in the table was from -70 cents to  $ 17 per barrel measured at international 
prices of product and crude and excluding all taxes as table 9 does. With a refinery 
loss factor of 7% rather than 10% this refinery margin in $ per barrel for Indian 
refining would range from $ 1 to $22.  The crack spread (3:2:1) Nymex is the 
difference between (price of 2 barrels of gasoline + one barrel of fuel oil) and 3 
barrels of crude divided by 3. It is measure that can be used to monitor the spread 
between crude and product prices. Since the middle and light distillate prices move 
in sync globally (unlike in India where there are differential taxes and large 
distortions) the 3:2:1 spread is a shortcut and easily understood indicator of the 
profitability of refinery operations.  
Competition through yield increases and reduction in distribution costs would drive 
the prices of retailed products lower down from the initial market prices discovered. 
Since there is no administered element, oil companies would truly compete instead 
of indulging in pseudo competition as is the case today.  
Efficiency by way of use and sourcing of lower priced crude, improvement in refinery 
yield, cost cutting in distribution, use of scale economies and innovations in 
distribution and transportation would all  thereby be incentivized.  Also incentivised 
would be the competitive pricing of multiple products of a refinery and the output 
mix would tend towards optimality given  the demand that can be effectively 
accessed. 
At equilibrium, i.e. within a few years as the price discovery process is allowed to 
work itself the price of the principal petroleum products would vary within narrow 
bands , as outlined above, and the variation would depend upon the price elasticity 
of demand, degree of processing, substitution,  besides the international prices and 
transportation costs. 
It is expected that the prices would settle down as indicated below in inverse order 
of their price elasticity of demand: Naphtha, Lube oil, Diesel, LDO, kerosene, LPG, 
petrol, naphtha, FO/LSHS, petcoke and conditioned by international prices.  
The conditioning by international prices would be such as to remove arbitrage option 
between prices in India and globally say in the middle east. Thus no price would be 
higher in India than the Plat (Middle East) prices + logistic costs of imports  
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and no price would be lower than the Dubai (or Singapore price) – logistic 
costs of export from India.  
Note here that the logistic cost includes the cost of freight, of capital blocked up, 
insurance and risk associated  with movement. 
Between petrol diesel and kerosene, petrol would have the lowest price since the 
price elasticity of its final demand is higher. Essentially the refineries would end up 
setting their prices to maximise their profit in a joint cost situation where price 
elasticity of demand would play its role. The same would again be conditioned by 
transport costs with reference to a feasible territory of reach.  
The existence of cheap transport routes in the form of oil (and crude pipelines too) 
would set limits to the local monopolistic advantage of particular producers. In other 
words the price of a product in no place would be higher than the minimum of 
(refinery sale price of any other competitor + logistic cost of transporting 
from the competitors refinery), the minimum being over all competitors, 
assuming that all players compete.  
Since refineries are well spread through the country and the access from important 
port refineries into the interior is good, there is little territory in India where any 
particular company would be able to exercise significant monopoly power. 
In what follows we argue that the expected competition in refining and in oil retailing 
is adequate to make the industry competitive and the continued high growth would 
allow for entry.  With independent retail outlets and open access to the infrastructure 
part of the business – (oil pipelines) which  can be ensured through appropriate 
regulation, competition is likely to be quite good. 
Competition Would be Adequate 
Table 10 brings out the Herfindhal Index
16 a measure of concentration in an industry 
and widely used. When considered over the capacity since this provides the potential 
                                                  
16 The Herfindhal Index can be defined as the sum of the squares of the market share of 
competing firms. Thus  ∑ =
i
i S H
2  where  i S is the share of the i
th firm. The inverse of the 
H-index can be interpreted as the number of firms in the market adjusted for concentration. 
It is the most justified measure of concentration.  
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for competition in refining then the index is about 0.18 when considered over firms 
and 0.09 when considered over refineries. In reality given the geographical aspect of 
transport costs the effective concentration is likely to be more. The measure is 
somewhat higher than in the US where it has been of the order of 0.09 increasing to 
about 0.12 in the 90s.  It is of the same magnitude as in many other advanced 
countries.  In share of plants rather than firms are used  it is somewhat lower and 
comparable to that in the US regionally.  In Indian regions the concentration is likely 
to be higher though the smaller geographical size of the Indian landmass should 
result in higher effective competition at the regional level for the same concentration.  
In oil retailing (marketing) the concentration would be even lower since there are 
independent retailers, and the shares in terms of the number of retail outlets     Most 
importantly the current consumption of petroleum products can only grow to reduce 
the H-index if policies that ensure competition are in place. Most important of these 
would be the freedom to source bulk fuel by ROs on own account, i.e. to have 
brands of their own. Then  the last mile can become highly competitive. If the policy 
of independent retailing results in about a third of the ROs being impendent,  then 
the oil refining and distributing companies have to compete in sales to bring the 
price down to its competitive level. Historically though since OMCs developed their 
product and marketing and there is value in a brand right across the country and in 
near uniform pricing, the mode of development has been on the basis of exclusive 
dealerships tied to particular OMCs, though this is changing rapidly
17. In India many 
of the cities are ripe for independent dealerships both local and chains so the 
motorists can have their own preferences.  
Independent Retail Outlets and Internal Markets in Product 
The potential for competition at the retail level is quite high
18. Currently the average 
thru put of ROs is very low since adulteration, short selling, and administered prices 
allow even small thru put ROs to co-exist with larger ROs who may be either 
                                                  
17 Thus the California Independent Oil Marketers Association reports that it is able to 
innovatively address small markets and seasonal markets, provide fuel in national 
emergencies besides having its main markets in institutions and firms. 
(http://www.cioma.com/index.html , 26
th  April 2009). 
18 Independent retailers as also franchisees of companies and company ROs would have to 
be ‘licensed’ by the safety authorities.  
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avoiding these malpractices or marginally indulging in the same. With the “price 
arbitrage” option vanishing (once prices are set by the markets under uniform and 
value added taxes as we recommend in this report), these malpractices would 
collapse and competition in the true sense would emerge across ROs. The process 
can be enhanced by allowing merchant ROs who are not agents of OMCs to emerge, 
and who can source fuel from the wholesale market i.e. from any refining /trading 
company, which can develop if the ‘last mile access’ is opened up as we propose. 
The entire business of rent seeking (administrative allocation of ROs and rationing of 
shortages) would collapse, and overcoming adulteration and short selling would be 
simple, and not the major governance problem that it is with perhaps a large part of 
the time and effort of sales personnel in oil companies being absorbed in a socially 
wasteful activity of preventing corruption and adulteration.  
Similarly, wholesale markets for the principal fuels would emerge centred around 
important distribution territories, which could negate the marginal monopolistic 
power that OMCs have in retailing through close control over, their affiliated ROs. 
The co-existence of independent ROs, agencies of OMCs, and OMC run ROs would 
be healthy for competition and high quality of the product. 
There is really no need for any special measure to support oil marketing companies 
to open and maintain retail outlets in far flung and remote areas. Through a process 
of spatial price adjustment, the supplies in all but the most remotest areas (in fact 
wherever there is sufficient demand) would be maintained by the market, and since 
there is competition the price difference would be reflective of the logistic cost from 
the nearest reference location. 
Thus freedom to price oil products differently at different locations with no more 
than a oversight by the Competition Commission is called for.
19 This oversight is 
merely as a precautionary measure (without any direction to influence). Today when  
the ROs of the OMCs hold prices lower than cost of serving at a particular location 
they are indirectly cross subsidise. And merchant ROs would find it difficult to 
                                                  
19 Thus in a place like say Uttarkashi  or Gangotri at an additional cost of no more than the 
competitive logistic cost of reaching a road tanker from Haridwar, retail outlets should come 
up. Today it is the very regulation and policy of holding prices uniform  at all locations in a 
certain region, that makes few formal retail outlets come up. 
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compete with them. Thus retail price maintenance is anti-competitive.   As a result 
none or few ROs operating independently can come up today.  It is interesting that 
only small sellers who sell from oil drums operate further into the interior from 
Uttarkashi for instance, who carry out a business, that is under scaled  and therefore 
more expensive than what would have happened had merchant ROs been allowed 
and encouraged. 
Endowment Based Direct Subsidies are Crucial 
 
All subsidies have to be directly delivered to the intended consumer as an 
endowment. All current BPL card holders who are entitled to say K litres of kerosene 
per year per person can be issued chip (smart cards) with assignment of K*(family 
size) litres (which currently would be 2*5*12=120  litres per year of kerosene 
which can be made completely tradable.  
 
The details of such a scheme which should not cost more than 5 paise to transfer 
subsidy of Re.1 have already been brought out in (Morris S, Pandey Ajay & SK Barua, 
2006). The scheme as described in an earlier report ought to be put in place. See 
“Box 1: Eliminating Distortions and Directing Kerosene Subsidies to the Poor” for a 
summary presentation of the proposals  to ensure low cost administration of direct 
subsidy in the case of kerosene based the same study. 
 
In the case of LPG subsidy similar smart cards can be issued to all consumers 
including to those below BPL entitling per family to a cylinder of LPG (14.2Kgs) at Rs, 
360 (i.e for a subsidy = current market price for 14.2 kgs – 360) per family, which 
again can be made completely tradable. The details of this scheme have been 
brought in Pandey, Ajay and Sebastian Morris (2006).  Politically it would be unwise 
to limit the endowment to only BPL families. All new connections can be freely given 
at the market price and all consumption in excess of one cylinder would be at the 
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Box 1: 
Eliminating Distortions and Directing Kerosene Subsidies to the Poor 
 
“OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXISTING SYSTEM: 
 
•  There is clear evidence that a significant percentage (about 40) of kerosene is 
diverted out of the PDS and sold at higher prices. 
•  The manual information and control system to keep diversions and leakages in 
check is completely ineffective. 
•  The commission paid to the distribution channel, in particular to the retailers of 
kerosene does not make the business financially viable.   
•  The rents being earned by those associated with the distribution channel for 
kerosene are very large. 
•  The rent extractors have become so well entrenched over time that it is plausible 
that other agencies in the system and even the regulatory process itself may be 
hostage today to their influences. 
•  The indirect losses from use of sub-optimal fuel mix, product mix and investment 
decisions are very large and may harm the economy significantly in the long 
term. 
•  The subsidy through uniform low pricing of kerosene, though intended for the 
poor, is in fact not reaching them as they are in no position to buy much of  the 
kerosene allotted to them even at the low issue prices being charged by the fair 
price shops. 
•  In sum, kerosene subsidy has become the ever-growing white elephant of the 
Indian economy.  
 
 ALTERNATIVE TO EXISTING SYSTEM: 
 
•  It is imperative to bring into play information and communication technologies so 
as to break the stranglehold of the distribution channel by capturing information 
at the point of sale and thereby creating a permanent audit trail of all relevant 
transactions. 
•  It is imperative to empower the target segment, the BPL families, by providing 
them with the freedom to choose the manner in which they would like to 
consume the subsidy intended for them. 
•  The well-documented failure of TPDS (Targeted Public Distribution System), 
implemented on an experimental basis, clearly demonstrates that tinkering with 
the existing system would not achieve the twin goal of benefiting the really poor 
and not-benefiting the non-poor. 
•  The direct subsidy scheme, which is based on free market pricing of 
kerosene, and therefore a radical departure from the current method of 
uniform low pricing is the answer for achieving effectiveness of 
subsidization. 
•  The subsidy is to be disbursed to the poor through smart cards and the 
accounting of disbursal is to be done using systems similar to those used by 
credit card companies. 
•  The purchasing power put in the hands of the beneficiaries would allow them to 
use it for spending on their choice of commodities and services and thereby not 
only enhance the use of subsidy to the full but would also add greatly to their 
welfare.  
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•  The proposed system would almost completely eliminate the indirect losses 
arising from distorted choices since the price of kerosene would be market 
determined and therefore not relatively cheap compared to alternate fuels. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED SYSTEM: 
 
•  A task force (TF) must be set-up for implementation, with wide-ranging powers 
and full financial backing of the government of India so as to be able to function 
autonomously. 
•  The task force should consist of eminently qualified individuals with diverse skills 
and known for their integrity and appreciation for the significance of the task to 
be performed. 
•  The critical task of identifying the beneficiaries at micro-level should be done 
using all possible sources of data and information (outlined in the report) so as to 
minimize both, Type I and Type II errors, that is, chance of exclusion of genuine 
beneficiary and chance of inclusion of spurious beneficiary in the list of target 
beneficiaries. 
•  The disbursement of subsidy should be such that the disbursement is recorded at 
the point of transaction and get immediately captured in a large centralized 
database, thereby creating a permanent audit trail, akin to operation of credit 
cards (details outlined in the report). 
•  The activities associated with initial identification of beneficiaries, disbursement 
of subsidies and updating the list of beneficiaries is to be done by well-qualified 
private agencies. 
•  The operations of the system should be monitored by an SPV to be specially 
created for the purpose and working under the broad supervision and direction of 
the task force. 
•  The SPV and the TF should ensure full transparency of operation of the private 
vendor and the scheme by making public all relevant information on the 
operation of the system and opting for periodic audit of operations. 
 
GAINS FROM THE PROPOSED SYSTEM: 
 
•  The immediate gain to the exchequer from the proposed system, due to market 
based pricing of kerosene would be an estimated inflow of Rs. 14000 crore per 
year by way of additional taxes. 
•  This gain from additional taxes, based on certain assumptions, is expected to rise 
to over Rs. 37000 crore in 2010-11. 
•  The gain to the economy and society at large from elimination of indirect losses 
due to sub-optimal choices of fuel-mix, product-mix, and asset mix would be 
immense as they would be completely eliminated in the new system. 
•  The most important gain however is that the beneficiaries would be in a position 
to fully utilize their entitlements and spend the same on products and services of 
their choice, significantly enhancing thereby the utility of their consumption.”  
 
From, Summary and Conclusions  in Morris, Sebastian, Ajay Pandey and Samir K. 
Barua (2006), “A Scheme for Efficient Subsidisation of Kerosene in India (Based on a 
Report Commissioned by the Petroleum Federation of India)”, WP No. 2006-07-06, 
July 2006, pp. 47-4 
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The endowment card for kerosene and LPG can be bundled to ensure that the 
benefit on both together does not exceed a certain limit which is in units of fuel on a 
LPG equivalent of kerosene which a family of 5 can be expected to use in cooking 
and lighting. Already smart card systems when carefully designed and implemented 
as in the case of the National Medical Insurance Scheme in India have overcome 
many otherwise governance problem which as argued before are rife  in the case of 
the PDS, PDS kerosene, LPG etc. wherein subsidisation is based on lowering the 
prices. See “Box 2: Recasting LPG Subsidies in a Way that is Non-Distortionary”  for a 
brief presentation of the proposals to remove the distortions in subsidisation of LPG 




Recasting LPG Subsidies in a Way that is Non-Distortionary 
 
“1. LPG subsidy has grown historically and has become quite high because of 
aggressive growth in connections and increase in per connection consumption in 
addition to rising input costs. 
 
2. Given that there is evidence that LPG subsidy has been ineffective in increasing 
penetration in rural and poorer households, there is a case for capping and targeting 
LPG subsidy. Otherwise it can explode over time unless new connection growth is 
curbed, which is indefensible. 
 
3. The best option to curtail LPG subsidy would be to eliminate it straight away. 
However, there are at least two factors which are likely to make it difficult.  Firstly, 
the input costs are high (from a historical point of view). Secondly, the high input 
prices coupled with lack of preparatory ground work may result in political 
mobilization against the move. 
 
4. Even if difficult to implement, the option to eliminate LPG subsidy need to be 
debated and be at the focal point as more information indicating the flow of LPG 
subsidy would help in softening and preparing the ground. It is also important to 
keep this option in play as all other next best options are prone to misuse and may 
become ineffective over a long enough period through systematic abuse. These 
possibilities are curbed as long as there would be uncertainty about continuation of 
subsidy. 
 
5. The next best option which sharply focuses on the deserving segment is direct 
subsidy to below poverty line families. These households may be given up to 8 
coupons every year. Each coupon can be used for subsidy for a cylinder. A 
separation of the identification and issuance of coupon is critical to the success of 
this scheme. As clarified elsewhere in the study, by coupon we mean any technology 
which allows the target group to get a well-defined and secured entitlement. It could 
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6. Direct subsidy to BPL family through coupon would allow them to pay cash equal 
to retail price less the subsidy per coupon. This amount and a coupon would entitle 
them to get a cylinder. The coupon surrendered to the dealer would be in turn be 
surrendered by him to the Oil companies, who would pay equivalent cash to the 
dealer. In fact, dealer may get an additional compensation for the cost of accounting 
and administration. 
 
7. The BPL coupon holders may be allowed to trade the coupons as this would 
convert the LPG subsidy to income subsidy. Even if the transfer or trade is not 
allowed, it is bound to take place and the net effect of that would be sharing of 
subsidy between intended beneficiary and some intermediary. 
 
8. Targeting LPG subsidy to BPL consumers may encounter problems in improper 
identification about which Oil companies need to work closely with district/ local 
administration so as to proactively eliminate inappropriately classified consumers. 
 
9. Targeting BPL consumers for LPG subsidy also leaves open the possibility of non-
BPL consumers taking connections in the name of BPL consumer and that of BPL 
consumers opting for multiple connections. Both problems are to some extent self 
limiting (due to conflict and due to connection charges) but warrant closer 
examination of new connections under BPL category. 
 
10. Coupon based direct subsidies require efficient administrative support associated 
with coupon distribution, appropriate documentation, coupon accounting, collection 
and cash reconciliation. Coupons have to be difficult to copy and print to prevent 
frauds etc. This can be ensured by printing of coupons at a security press. 
 
11. As the extent of penetration of LPG in BPL families might be too low and because 
of political difficulties, the next best option would be to limit the number of cylinders 
for which the subsidy would be allowed for all the customers. To start with, each 
consumer may be given 6 coupons per year which allows him to get 6 cylinders at 
subsidized rate.  
 
12. Even though this option does not attempt to direct the subsidy to more deserving 
segments, yet this option cuts down the overall subsidy by about 25% in one stroke 
(or about Rs.40/50 per cylinder). Coupons could be given to all consumers without 
the need to worry about misclassifications.  
 
13. Like in case of targeting BPL consumers, this option also suffers from the 
possible misuse through multiple connections. The Oil companies would have to have 
data base of all of their consumers to prevent such a possibility. In addition, a sound 
coupon disbursement, collection and accounting system needs to be developed by 
them. Outsourcing of such administrative tasks is feasible and might be more 
efficient as well, in case eventually subsidies are withdrawn. 
 
14. Under this option, a phased subsidy elimination program can be laid out. After 6 
coupons per year, the number of coupons may be brought down to 4 and then to 2. 
Phasing down of subsidy by reducing number of coupons may be linked to input 
costs with faster phasing down if the input prices are lower and vice versa. This 
would allow the expectations of consumers to be modified gradually.  
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15. Irrespective of any method of LPG subsidy reduction, there is a need to examine 
the taxes built in currently estimated gross subsidy. The net subsidy to the 
consumers should be the basis of elimination otherwise the target is self-defeating 
(by being higher) and not justifiable (elimination of gross subsidy means moving 
from net subsidy to net tax regime). 
 
16. Even if the state governments continue to collect sales tax, the central 
government which also collects taxes and simultaneously bears subsidy should 
neutralize the subsidy estimate from central taxes. The state governments need to 
be persuaded to retain the current amount of sales tax (but at a lower rate) 
otherwise states get higher revenue and the price target goes up. 
 
17. In case the state governments were to pay truant on this issue, there is a need 
to explore whether differential issue prices can be used as a deterrent. 
 
18. Another issue which warrants closer examination is the impact of volatility of 
input costs on retail prices. Had the industry been competitive, this would not have 
been a major issue. Clearly, some oversight or regulation is required so that prices 
are changed at appropriate intervals and are still neither excessive nor too low. It 
would be appropriate to set up a regulator to review periodically review the input 
costs and allow changes. He may allow prices on the basis of average cost with a lag 
or may prescribe a band linked to input costs and may monitor the prices to prevent 
any abuse. 
 
19. The rationalisation of prices and of tax reform in this sector is long overdue. 
These need to be simultaneously pursued. It is possible for the entire sector to move 
towards a revenue neutral cenvat based tax regime. That in itself and the direct 
subsidization of kerosene and LPG through coupons is necessary to remove all the 
distortions. The ill effects of the distortions that result in misuse, diversion, revenue 
loss, and added environmental and governance problems can only be feasibility 
addressed by the movement away from price based subsidies to direct subsidies. 
Similarly kerosene subsidises if correctly targeted and administered can have large 
spillovers in the management of subsidies in LPG.”  
 
From Section 6: Brief Findings and Recommendations, Pandey, Ajay  and 
Sebastian Morris, “Subsidisation of LPG: A Study of Possible Options in India Today 
(Based on a Report Commissioned by the Petroleum Federation of India)”, W.P. No. 
2006-04-07, April  2006, pp. 36-38. 
With direct subsidies in kerosene the role of the PDS retailers exclusively for 
kerosene is no longer there and as such the PDS kerosene shops and the associated 
s y s t e m  c a n  b e  w o u n d  u p  o r  e x p e c t e d  t o  e v o l v e  i n t o  v i a b l e  r e t a i l e r s  o f  k i r a n a ,  
kerosene, gas and other products. 
Kerosene wholesalers whose investments are largely in trucks to carry kerosene 
(they have a little investments in storage tanks) can easily transform themselves into 
product carriers in general.   
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Retail outlets of other products (petrol, LPG and diesel) could also sell kerosene. But 
kerosene sales being in small quantities and also in rural areas the current small PDS 
retailers could and would continue to operate selling kerosene freely for all users 
including those with endowments (subsidy entitlements). Many of them are likely to 
combine kirana operations with kerosene retailing. Oil marketing companies would 
then find it worth their while to innovate to reduce the total cost of retailing including 
of kerosene delivery.   Indeed several innovations like thick plastic pouched kerosene 
in one litre kerosene packs, in pet bottles, dispensation through pumps besides the 
usual retail dispensation from small drums by gravity  feed would all be able to work 
together in different retailing contexts to be a part of the retail business as such. 
Similarly LPG applications other than for cooking-lighting
20, air conditioning, 
electricity generating, heating of water, automobile – can all co exist without 
necessarily separate channels and there could be no arbitrage since the market price 
for LPG adjusted for logistic, packaging and delivery cost would be the same. Use of 
LPG in lighting where electricity is a problem, when small cylinders are widely 
available could do much to improve the quality of lighting in areas prone to power 
cuts. 
Such entirely market based solution of use and distribution with endowments based 
direct subsidy is first best and removes all the perversities (adulteration , diversion 
etc and the governance failure in oil marketing, the third order distortions that affect 
investments, and entry into oil retailing), and removes the need to set cost and 
prices. 
Role of Regulation of Pipelines 
The pipeline transport business is a natural monopoly
21 and therefore has to be 
subject to price regulation if open access and competition across territories is 
accepted as the basis for the organisation of oil retailing. The Petroleum and Natural  
                                                  
20 It is interesting that under the current regime a first best application of LPG at the 
household level is for lighting especially when there is no electricity.  But since this would 
demand small cylinders, and only cooking cylinders are subsidized, here we have a case 
where the first best use is discriminated against. 
21 Pipelines having network economies exhibit subadditivity of costs, resulting in market 
failure of the natural monopoly variety. Other segments do not have this any other significant  
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Gas Regulatory Act Board Act 2006 provides the framework for the regulation of the 
pipeline sector of gas, oil (crude) and product pipelines. While the direction of 
change indicated in the Act is towards complete open access, the proposals with 
regard to product and crude pipelines are far from being open access. Thus as per 
the Act open access is possible only on such pipelines as where the regulator licenses 
as open access. And only up to 30% of the capacity of existing pipelines (provided 
the incumbent is not using the same) can be declared as open access. Given the 
provisions of the law it is debatable if on open access basis pure pipeline companies 
would come forth without a plan, and unless invited by the regulator with take or 
pay contracts. Incumbent users with their own pipelines and other incumbents 
adding capacities would be able to set up dedicated capacities, and there are few 
incentives for them to go open access. Incentives to access each others networks at 
this stage of development is not likely to be a major force, but the regulator could 
insist on a certain portion of the fresh capacities to be necessarily in open access 
mode. Nevertheless since vast capacities especially in crude pipelines and product 
pipelines are likely there would be the dynamic contestability of growth which can be 
a competitive force, even if it means redundancy and higher social costs for a while.  
This dynamic aspect of natural monopolies considerable reduces the usual argument 
that all natural monopolies have to be regulated.  The worlds networks of pipelines, 
electricity lines, railways, etc. were build when demand was gripping rapidly.  Then 
the profit maximizing behaviour of the players is functional since in greatly 
expanding the network even when by reinvesting rents earned out of high tariffs, 
user values go up rapidly since these are determined by the shift from the earlier 
service to the new service.   As such little of these expanding networks had been 
regulated.  It is only as saturation was reached that the dysfunctionalities of 
monopoly pricing become severe, and the need for regulation arises.  See Morris, S, 
(2001) and Varma J.R.(2002) for arguments to this effect. In other words if the 
dynamic aspect of growing natural monopolies is considered, the usual argument 
that they ought to be regulated, based on static economic analysis, may be 
mistaken. 
                                                                                                                                         
market failure, other than features arising out of scarcity of resources and their 
monopolization, and  vertical integration economies. While these warrant competitive 
oversight and strategic response in the context of the interests of a country, they do not 
create the need for price regulation as such.  
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Pipelines can be subject to a variety of pricing methods but most efficient would be 
price cap, indexed to a relevant price index that captures the broad cost components 
of the pipeline business.   This can be easily done if the relevant business segment 
wise information can be obtained from the oil companies.  Alternatively the same can 
be worked  out from a set of projects in pipelines taken up by the oil companies. 
Since the “Petroleum and Gas Regulatory Act” has been notified for pipelines and 
storage facilities of both crude and product, access to pipe lines as this is likely to be 
made open access, there would further increase in the competitive pressure to 
reduce transport costs and more generally logistic costs. Players would be able to 
access each others marketing territories. 
The Petroleum and Gas Regulatory Authority could monitor (without having the 
power to determine) by checking whether product prices exceed the 
minimum(retail prices at a reference location + logistic cost from 
reference to the location in question, reference price at a location where 
there are wholesale prices + logistic cost of reaching the location in 
question + cost of retailing).  The factors such as the logistic cost can be once 
estimated by the regulator or a consultant on his behalf and indexed to appropriate 
prices, to monitor the prices at remote locations.  
In the case of prices being higher, the Competition Commission / Petroleum Gas 
Regulatory Authority would have to examine the situation in greater detail to remove 
the source of the higher price – such as non-competition or agreement to fix prices- 
but the regulator should not fix prices ever (other than for pipeline access and use), 
since that would violate competition, the process of price discovery and the role of 
p r i c e s  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s .   This is because oil refining and marketing 
including retailing are competitive activities. 
Handling Wind Fall Gains in Crude Production 
Producers of crude oil under the proposed regime could hope for “windfalls” when 
the crude oil price rise beyond its cost of production. In India this is significant only 
in the case of ONGC which produces about a third or less of the oil that is consumed 
in India.   
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The solution to the same at the first best level would be to leave ONGC with the 
rents, while granting it all the autonomy to use these rents in aggressive oil 
exploration in India as well as abroad. The government in this case can gain through 
market upswing on the share price once the announcement of clarity on the 
ownership of the oil fields is made. The residual problem, that this will leave current 
private shareholders of ONGC with windfall gains, cannot be avoided unless the 
government can first buy all the stock (at a backward looking prior determined stock 
price) and then make the announcement that assigns to ONGC its current operative 
fields with no restriction of the price it can obtain for its crude.. This would amount 
to a “nationalisation” before privatisation / commercialisation  since the dilution of 
ONGC’s stock thus far has been without clarity with regard to the property right on 
the oil fields. Only then can a windfall to the current non-government share holders 
be avoided.   
Windfall “Charge/Subsidy” 
The alternative solution to the same (at a level significantly below the first best) 
would be for the government to evoke a charge that is akin to royalty which may be 
called the “windfall charge” and which can be applied on oil price bands in the 
following manner.  
Imagine the cost of production (including a normal return at 20%) of ONGC today to 
be CONGC,0 which for the future may be indexed to the retail price index or to a 
relevant price index (Pt) suitably constructed that is reflective of the non-rent and 
non-tax cost components of ONGC per tonne of crude. 
CONGC,t = CONGC,0 Pt where Pt is the relevant price index. The weights for the relevant 
price index can be derived from ONGCs costs in the base period (today). Then if 
international price of crude is 20 % above the all inclusive cost of crude the 
additional “windfall charge” = current price of crude – 1.2*CONGC,0 Pt can be 
levied for every barrel of crude that ONGC produces. Concomitantly government 
would have to subsidise ONGC when crude prices fall below 1.2*CONGC,0 P t . The 
probability of such an eventuality while very small is not zero and hence this upfront 
understanding is necessary.  The factor of 1.2 is necessary to leave some “rents” 
(which are more correctly viewed as return to uncertainty not factored by markets) 
with ONGC to enable it to be aggressive in EP activities.  
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This solution would have the problem of denying the current non-government 
shareholders the upside. But since the risk of the government doing so was in 
existence ever since the first shares of ONGC were sold in the market, it would not 
amount to a gross violation of fairness on the part of the government. 
This option of a windfall tax/subsidy should  be applied only on the “historic” oil 
fields though earlier covered under APM,  not the oil discovered under the various 
NELPs.  The latter oil  whether produced by ONGC or the private sector are governed 
by the contracts implicit (and explicit) in the policies that were part of the 
announcement.  And change therein would amount to contract violation on the part 
of the government. 
State Taxes 
All state taxes that are not currently vatable (entry, purchase and turnover taxes and 
octroi) should be abolished. Where the centre does not have the jurisdiction, through 
fiscal inducements and suasion of fiscal reform, it must persuade the states to give 
up such adhoc and highly distortionary taxes.  
Sales taxes which are currently vatable and are under VAT should continue as such 
with far greater uniformity across states. The centre should try for outright 
uniformity thorough a standard VAT rate. Then the same may be collected along 
with the excise (CENVAT) on value added basis though on a separate account to be 
disbursed to the state government , with an equal weight for production and 
consumption.  This is eminently feasible and would not penalise producing (refining 
and extraction states as is the case today). 
While convergence of state taxes to a common rate is important, even more 
important is the abolition of any specific duties or rates and the need to not deviate 
from the value added principle. 
A Temporary Deviation from the First Best 
Until a direct subsidy scheme is put in place the oil companies have to be directly 
compensated for the kerosene and LPG they deliver through the following formula.  
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SubsidyPaidToOilCompanies = 
TonnesOfKeroseneGivenToStateGovernmentforPDS* (LandedCrude 
PricePerTonneOverPast Month * (1/RefineryYield)*(1+StandardMargin) – 
PDSPricetoStateGovtPerTonne + taxes on OneTonneOfKerosene) 
The StandardMargin can be determined as the current cost (other than input and 
tax) of refining one tonne of product + moving one tonne of product over a distance 
of 800 Kms the average lead for kerosene from refinery or import point. There is 
only a need to get this approximately correct. Once arrived at it can be indexed to a 
relevant price index as follows: 
0.6*CrudePriceIndex + 0.4WPI, since about 60% of the total cost (exclusive of 
input and taxes) of refining and transport can be related to the price of crude and 
the rest being more general – on account of labour, local transportation etc be 
indexed to the WPI. This would amount to the subsidy being given in a way that 
does not require cost plus regulation with all attendant evils of cost plus. 
Thus for  
StandardMargin(t+1) = 
StandardMargin(t)*(0.6CrudePriceIndex(t+1)+0.4*WPI(t+1)) 
Where WPI and CrudePriceIndex in the base year are =1. 
Similarly for LPG the  
SubsidyforLPGPaidtoOMCs = TonnesOfLPGSoldUnderOneCylinderScheme* 
(LandedCrudePricePerTonneOverPastMonth * (1/Refinery 
Yield)*(1+StandardMargin) – IssuePricePertonneOfLPGBeforePackaging 
+ ExcisetaxesOnOneTonneOfLPG 
The StandardMargin even in this case should be suitably indexed. 
The StandardMargin can be determined as the current cost (other than input 
and tax) of refining one tonne of product + moving one tonne of product 
over a distance of 300 Kms the average lead for moving a tonne of LPG to 
a bottling plant + the cost of bottling (excluding input and taxes). The 
bottles are assumed to be picked up by the ROs and distributed at a cost they incur  
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with a maximum margin fixed on the same as certain trade margin which oil 
companies can fix. There is only a need to get this approximately correct. Once 
arrived at it can be indexed to a relevant price index as follows: 
0.4*CrudePriceIndex + 0.6WPI, since about 40% of the total cost (exclusive of 
input and taxes) of refining and transport can be related to the price of crude and 
the rest being more general – on account of labour, capital cost of bottling, local 
transportation etc be indexed to the WPI. This would amount to the subsidy being 
given in a way that does not require cost plus regulation with all attendant evils of 
cost plus. 
Thus for  
StandardMargin(t+1) = 
StandardMargin(t)*(0.4CrudePriceIndex(t+1)+0.6*WPI(t+1)) 
Where WPI and CrudePriceIndex in the base year are =1. 
In a later section we propose that in case the first best is not pursued but a retail 
price control mechanism is sought then rather than use the standard refining costs 
as defined above it would be better to use the Crack Spread on the NYMEX, since 
this being determined in a large market with depth would be fair to all producers and 
would not discriminate (or unduly reward) local operations over foreign refinery 
operations. 
When the subsidy is given this way the incentives to compete and reduce the costs 
of distribution are not affected and so there is minimal distortion on the producer 
side. The oil companies in having to maintain delivery prices of kerosene to the civil 
supplies departments and of LPG to the LPG ROs would nevertheless continue to 
keep the distortions on the user side on, since the retail price of the subsidised 
product is now affected. There is little justification for such a regime except to 
provide the time to work out a detailed direct subsidisation scheme on the lines 
already described and covered in an reports. (Morris, Sebastian and Pandey Ajay, 
2006; Morris Sebastian, Pandey Ajay and S.K.Barua, 2006).  
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SECTION VII 
CRUDE PRICE STABILIZATION FUND 
 
Introduction 
In this section, we present a proposal for a crude price stabilization fund that could 
be used to smooth out short run fluctuations in the global price of crude. The fund 
would have an effect similar to that of having a strategic reserve of crude that is 
drawn down during periods of higher prices and replenished during periods of lower 
prices. However, there are substantial differences as the proposed fund does not 
involve any actual stocks of crude. It is more like a “financial” virtual buffer stock 
that could provide some relief from a price shock, but not from a physical supply 
interruption. In our view, the strategic crude reserve serves completely different 
goals and should be taken up completely independently of our proposal for a 
stabilization fund. Energy security  can be best ensured by tying up long term crude 
sources. A strategic reserve crude reserve on the other hand provides insurance in 
times of war against blockades and other possible supply interruptions. 
The argument in favour of a crude price stabilization fund is only  a limited one viz 
that the global crude market is distorted by producer cartels that could move prices 
away from long run fundamentals in the short term. Moreover, the relatively low non 
operational stocks of crude globally mean that speculative forces could also cause 
short run movements in global crude prices that are not justified by fundamentals. 
The fund could moderate these short term spikes and insulate the economy from the 
ill effects of these transient shocks. 
This is not our preferred recommendation. Nevertheless, we present the same as the 
second best. This is because the historical experience in attempting stabilization of 
this kind has been dismal. More than a decade ago, Gilbert wrote an obituary
22 of 
such attempts to stabilize prices of globally traded commodities documenting the 
failure of international agreements in such diverse commodities as coffee, cocoa, 
rubber, sugar and tin. The bankruptcy of the buffer stock manager of the 
International Tin Council (ITC) almost a quarter century ago is a warning of how well 
intentioned schemes to smooth out price fluctuations can end up in disaster. The 
                                                  
22  Gilbert, C. L. (1996) “International Commodity Agreements: An Obituary Notice”, World 
Development, 24(1), 1-19.  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 63 
principal problem is that what appears to be a temporary aberration in prices may 
well turn out to be a semi-permanent change in price levels. Attempts to resist this 
change can lead to large losses which end up discrediting the entire scheme. 
If at all such a price stabilization is attempted, it should be subjected to strict 
discipline on floor and ceiling prices through mechanical formulas that do not leave 
any discretion to the managers of the fund. Historical experience suggests that 
discretionary changes in floor and ceiling prices never work in the desired manner as 
it becomes politically impossible to do the right thing at the right time.  
The leeway available to the fund in maintaining  prices away (lower) than market 
price would be very little for countries like India that are significantly import 
dependent.  For countries that are marginally dependent on imports the leeway  on 
the lower side is a lot more, provided that the government has the ability and the 
framework in place to tax the domestic producers of crude through an appropriate 
windfall tax as outlined in the section “Windfall gains in Crude Production”
23.  In 
other words, the tax/subsidy to the local producers of crude flow into/out of the 
stabilisation fund when allowed crude prices are significantly above cost/ when below 
cost.  This is discussed in Section “Domestically Produced Crude” later in this report. 
We visualize the stabilization fund as a counter cyclical tax/subsidy on crude that is 
revenue neutral over the entire price cycle. When crude prices are low, a tax 
(windfall tax) is levied on crude to moderate the fall in the price of petroleum 
products. This revenue remains ring fenced in the stabilization fund to be used when 
prices rise to abnormally low levels. At this point, the price of crude is subsidized 
from out of the resources of the fund to moderate the rise in the price of petroleum 
products. The fund must be designed so that over the entire cycle, the tax collected 
and the subsidy provided offset each and the operations of the fund are fiscally 
neutral. The stabilization would achieve two purposes. First, it would moderate the 
fluctuations in energy prices for Indian consumers and industry. Second, it would 
provide greater comfort to investors in energy conservation and alternative energy. 
These investments might not otherwise be made because of a fear that a sharp fall 
in crude prices might make these investments unviable. 
                                                  
23 This presumes that the cost of production of domestic crude is significantly lower than the 
international price of crude at most times.  
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Stabilization Rules 
Though the fund would be revenue neutral over the price cycle, it would be in 
surplus or deficit at different points of time. The deficit would be met from a credit 
line from the government while the surplus would be invested in government 
securities. The line of credit is needed because the fund may encounter a period of 
high prices before it encounters a period of low prices and might therefore have to 
pay out large stabilization subsidies before it has earned any stabilization taxes. This 
borrowing would be repaid out of surpluses earned at a different point in the price 
cycle. After all borrowings have been repaid, further surpluses would be invested to 
meet future deficits. 
The fund would operate with strict limits on the quantum of the credit line used to 
pay out stabilization subsidies during the boom phase of the price cycle as also on 
the accumulated reserves built up from stabilization taxes during the bust phase of 
the price cycle. These limits are required to ensure that the fund remains revenue 
neutral over the cycle and does not become a hidden taxation device or an implicit 
subsidy mechanism. To enforce these limits, the stabilization rules would require that 
as the fund uses up the credit line, it automatically reduces the stabilization subsidy 
(raises the stabilized price of crude) rapidly enough to ensure that the credit line 
would never be exhausted. Similarly, as it accumulates reserves, the fund would 
have to reduce the stabilization tax (reduce the stabilized price of crude) rapidly 
enough to ensure that the accumulated reserves would never cross the upper limit.  
Our specific stabilization proposal is as follows. We propose that the crude price be 
stabilized towards a target price that is equal to the 12 month moving average of 
crude prices. If the stabilization fund is well within the limits on the maximum 
permissible surplus or deficit, the stabilized price would be equal to this target price. 
But as the fund moves closer to these limits, the stabilization would be reduced by 
moving the stabilized price away from the target price towards the actual price 
prevailing. The specific formula that we propose is that the subsidy is always limited 
to a level low enough to ensure that the subsidy can continue at the current rate for 
a specified period (say 3 months or 6 months) without crossing the limit on the fund 
deficit. Similarly the stabilization tax is limited to a level low enough to ensure that 
the tax can continue at the current rate for a specified period (say 3 months or 6 
months) without crossing the limit on the fund surplus.   
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In Figure 8,  we simulate the functioning of a stabilization fund of $ 25 billion
24 using 
the Nymex crude futures prices
25 for the period from 1983 to 2008. We find that a 
$25 billion fund is inadequate to deal with the price spike beginning late 2007. For 
almost a year, from October 2007 to September 2008, stabilization is incomplete and 
during March-August 2008, stabilization has to be virtually abandoned as the 
stabilization fund does not have enough money.  
The stabilization fund does much better if the limit is raised to $40 billion
26 as shown 
in Figure 9. In this case, the problem is only for a few months during May-August 
2008. For about half of even this period, there is a high degree of stabilization, but in 
late June and early July 2008, less than half of the price spike is eliminated through 
stabilization. 
We believe that a stabilization fund somewhere between $25 billion and $40 billion 
would be appropriate for India. The price spike of mid 2008 was far too high to be 
managed by any reasonable stabilization fund and therefore it is quite acceptable to 
set the fund limit at a level that handles all spikes except this. 
Stabilization of Prices of Petroleum Products 
The purpose of the crude price stabilization fund is to stabilize the prices of 
petroleum products within India. Competition between refiners and marketing 
                                                  
24  Actually, the size of the fund must grow as India’s oil consumption grows. In our 
simulation we assume that the fund is $25/bbl times the annual crude consumption in 
barrels. In other words, the fund is large enough to provide a subsidy of $25/bbl for a whole 
year. Since the 2007 crude consumption in India is about a billion barrels, this translates into 
about $25 billion. 
25  We use daily prices of the near month Nymex contract. In practice, Brent crude futures 
or other benchmarks closer to the Indian crude basket could be used. The fund might also 
operate on a weekly or even monthly basis rather than on a daily basis. There might be merit 
in averaging prices of several futures contracts (near month, mid month and far month) and 
in averaging prices over a week or so. This would eliminate issues like the abnormal one day 
spike in the expiring near month contract on September 22, 2008. Since our simulation is 
only illustrative in nature, we do not carry out these refinements and suggest that the one 
day spike of  September 22, 2008 be simply ignored. 
26  As explained in footnote  above, the fund is actually $40/bbl times the annual crude 
consumption in barrels. In other words, the fund is large enough to provide a subsidy of 
$40/bbl for a whole year. Since the 2007 crude consumption in India is about a billion barrels, 
this translates into about $40 billion.  
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companies would ensure that the stabilization of crude prices passes through to 
petroleum products though the pricing of these products is left to market forces.  
However, it is important to ensure that the crude stabilization taxes and subsidies are 
applied only to the crude content of all petroleum products consumed in India. 
Conceptually, what we would like is a scheme under which whenever a litre of petrol 
or more generally of a litre of any petroleum product is consumed within India, the 
stabilization tax/subsidy on the crude required to produce this petrol has been 
collected/disbursed by the fund. To implement this, the fund would lay down 
standard conversion factors that specify the crude content of every major class of 
petroleum product consumed in India. This can be based on the actual refining yields 
in the previous year in India.  
Treatment of Exports and Imports 
For administrative convenience, it is easier to keep track of exports and imports than 
to keep track of consumption. The customs records provide fairly reliable data about 
exports and imports that are less vulnerable to under and over statement than 
consumption data. For this reason, we propose that the stabilization fund base the 
collection/disbursement of the stabilization tax/subsidy entirely on exports/imports of 
crude
27 and petroleum products.  
For example, suppose a refiner imports and refines 100,000 barrels of crude, and 
then exports petrol equivalent to 25,000 barrels of crude input and sells the 
remaining refined products in India. If there is a stabilization tax of $10 per barrel of 
crude, the refiner will pay a stabilization tax of $1 million while importing the crude 
($10 x 100,000). When it exports the petrol, it receives a refund of stabilization tax 
equal to $250,000 ($10 x 25,000). Therefore, the net tax that it pays is equal to 
$750,000. This is equal to $10 tax on the 75,000 barrels equivalent of crude that was 
sold in India. Conceptually, there is no difference between  
1.  Levying a tax/subsidy on the domestically consumed products, and 
2.  Levying a tax/subsidy on all imports and refunding the tax/subsidy on all 
exports. 
                                                  
27  In this section, we are ignoring domestically producing crude which is discussed in the 
next section.  
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The advantage of the latter is that the data is easy to collect from customs records 
while the former would require an elaborate system of data collection.  
Domestically produced crude 
We have three options for domestically produced crude. The first option is to expose 
the domestic crude producer completely to global market forces. The producer is free 
to export the crude or to sell in the domestic market at market determined prices. 
The buyer of crude from the domestic producer pays/receives a stabilization 
tax/subsidy just as if the crude had been imported. Thus the stabilization tax/subsidy 
applies only to domestically consumed petroleum products and the crude production 
industry is left alone. This is part of the first best option already discussed. 
The second option is to use domestic crude as a strategic asset to provide energy 
price cushion and to lower energy costs for Indian industry. Under this scheme, 
domestic crude is guaranteed a floor price of crude to induce investment in 
exploration and production of crude. In return, there is also a ceiling price on crude 
price for domestically produced crude. The government in effect sells a put option to 
and buys a call option on crude from the producer
28. The floor and ceiling prices (the 
strike prices of the call and the put) can be set so as to equalize the prices of the call 
and the put.
29 
The third option is to set the floor and ceiling prices low enough to make the collar 
valuable to the government and thereby levy an implicit tax on domestically 
produced crude. This tax could be paid into the stabilization fund to allow it to 
moderate the prices of petroleum products in India to a greater extent than is 
otherwise possible. 
Under the second and third options, we would propose that the floor price of 
domestically produced crude be set just high enough to provide a minimum rate of 
return on oil exploration and production. The ceiling price under the second option is 
                                                  
28  This combination is sometimes known as a collar. 
29  This makes it a zero cost collar.  
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then determined so as to make the collar zero cost to the government and to the 
producer
30.  
Under the third option, the ceiling price is set lower than that of a zero cost collar in 
order to levy an implicit tax. In other words, this option would use domestically 
produced crude to subsidize energy consumption in India. 
The Section on Windfall Gains discusses the same issue and outlines the method to 
set lower and upper collars  and thereby determine the windfall tax /subsidy. It is 
possible to treat state owned crude producers differently from privately owned crude 
producers. The state owned producers could be under option two or option three 
while leaving the private producers under option one. Alternatively, the state owned 
producers could be under option three while leaving the private producers under 
option two.  
Linkage with other strategic oil initiatives 
 
The Crude Stabilization Fund is very different in nature from other strategic initiatives 
that the government might consider like a strategic crude reserve or strategic 
acquisition of oil assets abroad. The stabilization fund is a set of mechanical rules 
that do not require any discretion or judgement. As stated earlier, global experience 
over the last half a century teaches us that strict adherence to mechanical rules is 
the only viable way to run a stabilization fund. 
The strategic crude reserve is designed to deal with physical supply disruption (for 
example) a disruption caused by war or internal disturbances. Its purpose is not to 
smooth oil price, but to ensure physical supply to strategic national needs under 
times of stress. It would be a mistake to run down the reserves merely to subsidize 
oil prices for the economy. Managing the strategic reserves would require operational 
                                                  
30 It is important to set the floor  rate high enough, to make exploration and production risk 
worth taking by the  upstream  companies. An additional  reason is that if alternatives such 
as domestic gas, hydropower, nuclear and in the future solar and bio-fuels have to emerge, 
the floor should be high enough and credibly communicated as such to potential investors in 
these alternative sources. India to almost all accounts would be deficit in energy. Therefore it 
is important that India has in place policies that engender the development of alternative 
sources of energy faster than what the market would have brought about. A crucial element 
in this policy is that  the price of oil is not artificially held low even for short periods since that 
would create uncertainty with regard to the viability of other options. Thereby the rents paid 
through high oil prices to other (surplus) countries would be replaced by costs (and hence 
value added) incurred locally, as these investments take place and alternatives are brought 
on line.  This for India would be optimal even if for the world in the short run it is not.  
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capabilities of storing crude efficiently for extended periods of time and protecting it 
against enemy forces. As such, the agency managing the strategic reserve needs 
significant specialized managerial and operational expertise.  
Acquisition of oil assets outside India is an investment activity that is conceptually 
close to a sovereign wealth fund. This is an activity that requires investment 
appraisal and management capabilities of a high order. This activity is different from 
that of either the stabilization fund or the strategic reserve. The stabilization fund 
does not require any judgement or discretion and the strategic reserve needs 
operational and technical skills rather than investment judgement. Also the 
protection against supply disruption provided by secure reserves within the country is 
of a different nature from that provided by oil assets outside India. 
As such, there are three different initiatives which are all conceptually different and 
are in some sense independent of each other: 
•  Stabilization fund 
•  Strategic crude reserve 
•  Strategic global oil asset acquisition  
For the purposes of this report on petroleum pricing, the stabilization fund is the only 
one that is relevant as it is the only one that impacts pricing. The others are 
potentially important and valuable initiatives, but they are in some sense beyond the 
scope of this report. Both from a strategic and from an organizational or managerial 
perspective, the stabilization fund is independent from the other initiatives.  
The only linkage that might make sense is that just as the stabilization fund could if 
desired sell a costless collar to domestic oil producers
31, it could if desired sell a 
costless collar to oilfields outside India owned and controlled by Indian entities.  
 
                                                  
31 See the section on “Domestically produced crude” above.  
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SECTION VI 
IMPROVED ADMINISTERED PRICING MECHANISM 
Introduction 
In this section, we present our least preferred alternative for petroleum pricing in 
India which is as close as possible to the current Administered Pricing Mechanism 
(APM). We strongly believe that this solution is far inferior to the two methods that 
we have proposed in earlier chapters. We propose this only as a short term interim 
measure while moving towards our preferred solution very quickly.  
Our reasons for not favouring the administration of prices  are the standard ones. It 
distorts product prices and encourages unhealthy substitution of subsidized products 
for other products which are more efficient. It dampens price signals and 
discourages energy conservation. It creates vast distortions and makes good 
governance almost impossible as mentioned before. It also threatens India’s 
international competitiveness in the long run. Our improvements in the APM do not 
address any of these issues and that is why we do not favour it ourselves. 
Our improvements only address the issue of providing reasonable price signals to the 
oil refining and marketing companies so that investments in refining and distribution 
are not distorted and efficiencies are rewarded. 
Our proposal is that the current APM or some variant thereof be used to set prices of 
petroleum products for the end consumer. Refiners and marketers would under the 
proposed scheme be unaffected by these prices because they would be paid a 
standard refining margin and a standard distribution margin. They would therefore 
be rewarded for operational and cost efficiencies without being burdened with the 
pricing subsidies.  
Standard Refining Margin 
Refineries are very long lived assets and it is absolutely critical to avoid misallocation 
of investment in refineries that are not globally competitive. We therefore propose 
that refineries be paid a standard gross refining margin in line with global trends. To  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 71 
avoid reliance on accounting data that is prone to manipulation, we propose to rely 
on simple but transparent pricing benchmarks.  
Specifically, we suggest use of the widely tracked crack spread based on futures 
prices. The most widely used crack spread is the 3:2:1 crack spread which assumes 
that three barrels of crude are cracked to produce two barrels of gasoline and one 
barrel of fuel oil
32. This is of course a very simplified assumption as it ignores the 
wide range of other petroleum products and also abstracts away from refining yields. 
Yet, it has the advantage of relying on very liquid futures prices that are completely 
transparent. Unlike more detailed prices from agencies like Platts, these prices are 
accessible to any citizen of India with an internet connection. 
In Figure 10, we plot the one month and twelve month moving averages of the crack 
spread since the mid 1980s. It is seen that during the 1980s and 1990s, the crack 
spread was relatively stable at around $5/bbl, but in this decade, the spread has 
become more volatile and has averaged around $10/bbl. In recent months, the 
spread has moved down from the historic highs achieved in 2007. 
We propose that the twelve month moving average of the crack spread could be 
used to provide a standard refining margin to be paid to the refineries for every 
barrel of crude processed by them. This would insulate the refineries from the price 
of crude as well as the end user prices of petroleum products. 
Standard Refining Yields 
If the refineries were paid a simple crack spread based on barrels of crude 
processed, they would have no incentive to optimize refining yields. Therefore the 
crack spread margin must be supplemented by rewards and penalties for refining 
yields. 
                                                  
32 This Crack Spread would be suitable for India. Price distortion in India (differential pricing) 
creates  a larger share for HSD than MS.  Since international prices for MS  and HSD are 
highly correlated using this crack spread would be alright. In any case since individual prices 
of crude, MS, HSD, FO are available it is always possible to construct a seemingly more 
suitable ‘crack spread for India’.  However since the Nymex spread is traded, hedging options 
would be available in a global setting and that would be useful, Being international in 
character over a period refineries would align themselves to the same.   
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In the chapter on the crude price stabilization fund, we proposed that the 
government lay down standard crude input required for producing each of the 
petroleum products. Based on these standards, it would be easy to determine the 
standard quantity of crude required to produce the actual outputs of any refinery. 
This quantity can be compared with the actual quantity of crude consumed to 
determine the quantity of crude saved or over consumed in the refining. This saving 
or excess consumption would be rewarded or penalized on the basis of the price of 
crude. 
Suppose for example that a refinery processes 100,000 barrels of crude and 
produces an output which based on standard yields should have required only 
99,100 barrels of crude. The refinery has used 900 barrels of crude in excess of the 
standard. It would therefore be penalized by an amount equal to 900 times the price 
of a barrel of crude. If another refinery processes 100,000 barrels of crude and 
produces an output which based on standard yields should have required 100,700 
barrels of crude, then it has saved 700 barrels of crude. It would therefore be 
rewarded by an amount equal to 700 times the price of a barrel of crude. 
As a further fine tuning, we propose that refineries be classified by scale and vintage 
into three or four categories and standard yield be laid down for each category. This 
categorization may be necessary because older refineries might use inferior 
technologies and therefore might achieve poorer yields. This must however be done 
with care to ensure that there is sufficient incentive to shut down old refineries and 
build new more efficient ones. 
Standard Distribution Margin 
We now turn to a similar mechanism to insulate the oil marketing companies from 
the distortions caused by the APM. Unlike the crack spread, there is no transparent 
and liquid benchmark for the distribution margin. This will have to be estimated on 
the basis of an analysis of cost components. 
There are broadly three components of the standard distribution margin as we 
visualize it: 
3.  Some costs like transportation are related to physical weight or volume. A 
standard distribution cost per litre could be used to cover these costs.  
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4.  Some costs like insurance, storage and evaporation losses are related to the 
value of the product and a standard distribution margin as a percentage of product 
value could be used to cover these costs. 
5.  A reasonable rate of return as a percentage of standard capital investment in 
distribution would be the third component of the standard distribution margin. The 
rate of return could be specified as a standard risk premium over the yield on 
government securities or some other measure of the risk free interest rate. 
It is important to ensure that all components of the standard distribution margin are 
based on standards (standard cost per litre, standard percentage markup and 
standard capital investment) and not on actual costs. This is essential to allow new 
entry into distribution of petroleum products and to foster competition between 
existing players. 
In our earlier discussion of a “temporary deviation from the first best free pricing” 
with direct subsidies, we had indicated how the distribution costs could be indexed 
and awarded to the companies for those products, whose retail prices are controlled. 
Here we additionally relate the standard margin to the crack spread on the Nymex 
and lay out the framework for regulating the refining operations, making the 
companies immune to the retail price of the final product in India; rather than 
develop an index to carry forward refining costs.  
Similarly here we retain the price cap regulation for distribution cost developed 
earlier under the topic of “temporary deviation from the first best”. 
Conclusions 
1.  Reform of the oil sector is long overdue. The problems in the sector emanate 
from the structure of central taxes and the system of subsidisation through 
prices.  Solutions to the problems necessarily have to address both tax and 
subsidy simultaneously. 
2.  The social and fiscal costs arising out of the current method of subsidisation, 
and taxation are very severe. Additionally the sector generates vast rents, 
and much  directly unproductive activities
33 take place both within and 
                                                  
33  The term “directly unproductive activities was originally used by Jagdish Bhagwati to 
describe socially wasteful activities arising out of rent opportunities created by policies such 
as licensing, quotas, artificial barriers to entry.  
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outside the sector.  Governance problems arise as a result. In attempting to 
overcome these through administrative action further distortions arise, and 
there is further addition to directly unproductive activities. 
3.  The recent attempt to use markers in rationed kerosene to prevent  its use in 
diesel (for adulteration) and in open sale kerosene, which has failed, is just 
one example of the vast unproductive activities generated by the price 
distortion. 
4.  The social losses include, misuse / wasteful use of scarce petroleum 
resources,  diversion, adulteration, other avoidable  negative externalities,   
improper substitution between products, tax arbitrage, distortion of consumer 
preferences and input choices of industries, and  international cross hauling 
of petroleum. While an accurate quantification of these costs  is difficult, it is 
almost certain that these losses are humongous and possibly many times the 
value of the consumer surplus arising out the subsidies delivered.  
5.  The fiscal costs are very large and much larger than that reported in the 
budget since they do not include the costs of diversion and tax avoidance 
that result from differential pricing. Thus in the case of kerosene the cost of 
delivering Rs. 2000 crore to the BPL consumers was in excess of Rs. 24, 000 
crore. (Based on Morris et al 2006). 
6.  Nearly all these costs, and problems arise not because of subsidisation per se 
but due to the use of varying retail prices that are used to  subsidise. Prices 
for the same product vary for different consumers besides. They also vary 
across products.  These tax /subsidy variations are the root cause of nearly  
all problems in the sector. Autonomous price variations (i.e. those resulting 
from the actions of  firms (under a regime of non-distortionary subsidies) 
would be small and  not subject to ‘arbitrage’ i.e. to the realisation of rents 
through diversion and adulteration. 
7.  Tax reform – viz casting all taxes in the form of  value added taxes has not 
taken place in the sector despite the passage of nearly 15 years since such 
reform was put in place in  nearly all other sectors of manufacturing. Now 
that the  a general goods and services tax on value added basis is on the 
cards, the insistence on price based subsidies, and varying prices through 
differences in the tax rates which are not vattable is an anathema.  
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8.  Such unvattable taxes and “cross subsidisation” has imposed a very large cost 
on Indian industry making it difficult for it to compete with industries based in 
China and the Asian Tigers.  
9.  The response to the oil price rise has been to, in an adhoc manner, delay or  
not allow  pass-through of the higher crude and oil prices. Thus the 
uncovered losses on account of incomplete pass thru has been “shared” by 
the government through excise tax “subvention”, losses carried to the 
balance sheet of oil marketing  and oil producing companies.  It opens the 
door to arbitrariness in economic governance, and imposes very large policy 
risks on industry and the consumer.  
10. Since commercially oriented entities cannot carry such uncovered losses 
(even if there are “indications”  that price falls would also be delayed in pass 
thru) the risks they face are large.  Unlike state owned enterprise private 
firms would value such indications differently, discounting the same steeply.  
This is especially so since they do not arise out a policy, law or an 
institutionalised process.  A non-level  playing field results therefore. The 
result has been the waste /underutilisation of vast distribution assets created 
by the private sector.  The private sector had earlier created these assets on 
the promise of the reforms in the sector. It has resulted in unnecessary 
export of petroleum product even as imports of the very same products take 
place. 
11. Not surprisingly therefore private investment has not generally gone into 
distribution. Since public sector firms have to bear the burden of adhocism 
they face a non-level playing field.  
12. The two discriminations due not cancel but multiply the risks in the industry 
both with regard to entry and operations.  
13. State owned companies can be forced t o  c a r r y  l o s s e s  o n  a c c o u n t  o f  
uncovered subsidies.  Even when these losses are made up subsequently   
when domestic prices are higher than that warranted by international prices,  
high risks are imposed since such compensation arises out of executive action 
of the state and not through policy or a well laid out framework . As such  the 
markets would high risk. Therefore public sector oil companies are valued 
very poorly in terms of their P/E ratio. Additionally the current mode of ad-
hoc administrative determination of allocation of subsidy cost is ofcourse 
unfair to minority shareholders in these companies.  
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14. The argument that little other than change at the margin in “reform” is 
possible is not quite convincing.  The approach of “reform” thus far has  been 
avoiding the recognising  the root of the problem. While the trade and import 
parity prices for oil products (the extant regime)  create some competition  in 
refining, it is no solution since they do not remove the distortions outlined 
above, And such parity pricing makes  distribution illegitimately  into a 
regulated business defacto, when  intrinsically it is a competitive business.  
Even the use of norms (based on past data) in this unwarranted regulation 
does not  recognise the fact that the industry is intrinsically (had it not been 
for this unwarranted regulation)  fully competitive except for the pipeline 
business. 
15. Similarly, the political difficulties in carrying out tariff reform have been 
exaggerated. Earlier expert  committees have ignored the use of direct 
endowment subsidies which potentially could remove the distortions outlined 
above, by liberating subsidies from prices. Such an approach by preserving 
and enhancing  consumer benefits to the subsidised sector can only be 
politically rewarding.  
16. We summarise the reform proposals: 
17. Complete deregulation of the sector allowing oil producers, oil refiners, 
marketing companies, and integrated operators to price their products as 
they deem fit
34. 
18. Recast central indirect taxes (excise whether specific or ad valorem) into a 
value added tax, as for any other product., i.e., allowing input credit for all 
registered intermediate users of petroleum products including of course the 
oil companies themselves, leaving out  only truckers, taxi operators and other 
small intermediate users.  
19. Central government revenues can be protected by working out a revenue 
neutral value added tax rate. This we have  estimated approximately to be  
110-120% of value added uniformly to all  segments in the industry. Such a 
tax regime would also be neutral to the  degree of vertical integration and 
remove the biases in the use of  products. 
                                                  
34 It is important to recognize that free pricing does not mean either import or trade parity 
pricing, both of which are a form of administered prices, but with reference to international 
prices.  
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20. Prices of all major products would settle down to around today’s diesel prices 
with very little difference between petrol, diesel and kerosene closing the 
large price arbitrage options (diversion and adulteration) that exist today. 
21. The Public Distribution System (PDS) is not necessary and ought to be 
dismantled.  Kerosene would then be  sold in the open market for all 
consumers. Kerosene could also be sold by retail outlets, kirana shops, other 
retail outlets,  and by current PDS retailers on par with kirana shops/ ROs. 
Ditto for LPG. 
22. Companies are then free to price their product. There is sufficient degree of 
competition in refining, marketing and retailing  to ensure that prices across 
locations do not vary by more that the difference in logistic costs of delivery 
to the locations from the cheapest sources. 
23. Subsidies are administered through endowments defined upfront, which 
allows the subsidised consumer to access his/her endowments, trade the 
same, convert the same into cash all without the causing any distortion. 
Consumer  welfare would be enhanced in a considerable way. 
24. Such subsidisation framework has to be developed in a programme mode on 
the  lines outlined in earlier reports submitted by the IIMA to the Petrofed.
35  
25. Imports and exports are completely free and all residual restrictions are 
removed. Only pipelines are subject to regulation by the Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Regulator.  
26. Independent retailing on a substantial scale can further enhance the 
competitiveness of the sector not only in retailing but also in refining. 
27. Crude, and product prices being not set/regulated  in any way would result in  
pass thru in accordance with the structure, logistics and costs, and demands 
in the market. This is as it should be. 
28. The difference between the cost of production of crude (under the ex-APM 
(Administered Price Mechanism) not the NELPs (New Exploration and 
Licensing Policy, various rounds) and the international price of crude is in part 
mopped up by the state. 
29. The above proposals constitute the recommendations and are first best and 
are to be preferred over the  second best proposals below: 
                                                  
35 Morris, Sebastian, Ajay Pandey and SK Barua (2006), and Pandey, Ajay and Sebastian 
Morris (2006)  
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30. The second best proposals  involve the  changes/recommendations  as before 
but additionally creates a “Crude Price Stabilisation Fund” (CSF) that allows 
crude prices (both sharp rises and sudden falls) to be moderated, so that  
pass thru is influenced by the managers of the  CSF.  
31. It is important that the CSF is set up as in independent body and insulated 
from the government and is governed by strict and automatic rules that make 
rapid price adjustment (to the market prices) necessary when the fund 
position is low, so that the probability of the fund going bankrupt is kept at 
nearly zero.  
32. A fund between  $ 25 to 40 billion is envisaged. A fund of $40 billion (Rs. 
200,000 crore) envisaged as a credit line would work in most situations.  
33. The stabilisation is based on a counter cyclical tax/subsidy on crude that is 
revenue neutral over the entire price cycle. The fund must be designed so 
that over the entire cycle, the tax collected and the subsidy provided offset 
each other and the operations of the fund are fiscally neutral.  
34. Though the fund would be revenue neutral over the price cycle, it would be in 
surplus or deficit at different points of time. The deficit would be met from a 
credit line from the government while the surplus would be invested in 
government securities. The line of credit is needed because the fund may 
encounter a period of high prices before it encounters a period of low prices 
and might therefore have to pay out large stabilization subsidies before it has 
earned any stabilization taxes. This borrowing would be repaid out of 
surpluses earned at a different point in the price cycle. After all borrowings 
have been repaid, further surpluses would be invested to meet future deficits. 
35. The fund would operate with strict limits on the quantum of the credit line 
used to pay out stabilization subsidies during the boom phase of the price 
cycle as also on the accumulated reserves built up from stabilization taxes 
during the bust phase of the price cycle.  
36. To enforce these limits, the stabilization rules would require that as the fund 
uses up the credit line, it automatically reduces the stabilization subsidy 
(raises the stabilized price of crude) rapidly enough to ensure that the credit 
line would never be exhausted.  
37. We propose that the crude price be stabilized towards a target price that is 
equal to the 12 month moving average of crude prices. If the stabilization 
fund is well within the limits on the maximum permissible surplus or deficit,  
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the stabilized price would be equal to this target price. But as the fund moves 
closer to these limits, the stabilization would be reduced by moving the 
stabilized price away from the target price towards the actual price prevailing.  
38. It is important to ensure that the crude stabilization taxes / subsidies are 
applied only to the crude content of all petroleum products consumed in 
India.  Whenever a litre of petrol (or more generally of a litre of any 
petroleum product) is consumed within India, the stabilization tax/subsidy on 
the crude required to produce this petrol has been collected/disbursed by the 
fund. To implement this, the fund would lay down standard conversion 
factors that specify the crude content of every major class of petroleum 
product consumed in India. This can be based on the actual refining yields in 
the previous year in India. It goes without saying  that the fund taxes 
/subsidies would have to be applied on / be made available to all players in 
the sector (traders, refineries, marketing companies) whether they are 
privately or state owned. 
39.   To ensure that such crude stabilisation measures do not affect the 
competitiveness of the industry exports of product (and crude) are taxed 
when crude is subsidised, and subsidised when crude is taxed. Appropriate 
conversion factors would apply. The conversion factor should be based on a 
refinery loss of between 10 and 7% say 8.5%. 
40. As a third “best” option which is not really an option in our view (is no reform 
at all since all the distortions of controlled and varying retail prices would 
continue) we suggest a “better APM” which involves regulating refineries by 
awarding them an internationally referenced standard  refining margin. Such 
a margin would not be administered and is independent of the final 
administered retail prices. It is based on the  Crack Spread on the NYMEX. 
Similarly, the distribution and marketing business is regulated through a price 
cap based on a price index  relevant  for distribution. This should not be 
considered as an option really, since it replaces the current norms of cost plus 
regulation with marginally slightly improved one, while retaining all the other 
ill effects of the current mode of  pricing, taxation and subsidisation. 
41. Above all we would emphasise that on political expediency or the social 
dimension our first and second best proposals cannot be rejected since on 
both these counts they are actually value enhancing. They would create  
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much political good will for the government initiating reform, benefit the poor 
and the consumer. It would also result in vast fiscal savings.   
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Table 1: Share of Primary Energy in Total Energy Consumed 
 India  South  Korea Brazil Japan Mexico  Taiwan
Coal 53  24 5 20 5  36
Hydro 6  <  1% 36 3 4  2
Nuclear 1  14 1 13 1  0
Other Renewable  1  < 1% 2 1 2  8
Oil 31  50 48 49 55  45
Natural Gas  8  12 7 14 32  9
    
Source: US Dept. of Energy, Country Analytical Briefs  
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Table 2: Some Aspects of the Taxation of Oil and Oil Products in India 
  2001-02  2002-03  2003-04  2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Excise and cess on crude oil (Rs. cr.)  2731 4501 5134 5248 5007 7034 6866
Excise and cess on product (Rs.cr.)  26606 31460 35017 37897 46742 50850 53365
            
Customs duties on crude (Rs.cr.)  4818 6820 7491 9761 7158 7583 9101
Customs duties on product (Rs.cr.)  1949 2346 3091 3489 4236 6426 9041
            
Excise Paid on all Petroleum products 
and crude per tonne of crude absorbed 
by economy (Rs./MT) 
2550.4 2904.8 3092.3 3278.5 3556.9 3715.6  
Customs Duty paid on all imports of 
petroleum products and crude per MT 
of crude and crude equivalent imported 
(Rs/MT) 
752.1 925.4 1002.8 1180.5 873.1 958.9   
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LPG 2278 8454 112 342 10849  30535.71 16.79 22.03% 19.96%
Naphtha 5307 18176 8411 21431 13886  25479.73 18.60 98.79% -22.35%
Petrol (MS)  421 12536 3615 10191 9286 28190.87 21.99 43.46% -34.40%
ATF 0 7850 3652 10254 3983  28077.77 22.46 91.69% -91.69%
Kerosene 1424 8621 150 541 9505  36066.67 28.85 16.56% 13.40%
Diesel (HSD)  968 53676 11369 29198 42896 25682.12 21.57 28.76% -24.25%
Fuel Oil  2983 12259 3759 4988 12618*  13269.49 11.94 53.43% -6.15%
Others **  4279 18498 2556 4149 17726  16232.39   38.56% 9.72%
All products  17660 140070 33624 81094 120749  24117.89   42.47% -13.22%
**Others are LDO, lube oil, LSHS, Bitumen, and other products 
*Including LSHS 
***At density at 15  deg. C.  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications
W.P.  No.  2010-03-03   Page No. 85 
 
 
Table 4: Certain Aspects of Taxation in Relation to Value Added in the Petroleum 
Sector in India 
   AB C   D
1 Value  Added  (Output-Input-Indirect 
Taxes) (Rs. crore)  22809 27883 44537 95228
2 Value  Added  (PBIT+deprn.+ 
Wages and Salaries)(Rs. crore)  42278 34628 51988 128894
3  Indirect taxes (Rs. crore)  57908 8072 9814  75794
3(a)  of which excise duties  55175 6885 6110  68171
3(b)  .. sales taxes  476 619 320  1415
3(c)  ...other indirect taxes  2257 568 3384  6208
4  Royalties/knowhow paid (Rs. crore)  133 0 7223  7356
5  Wages and Salaries (Rs. crore)  5658 2255 6708  14622
6  Interest paid (Rs. crore)  3459 2279 5046  10784
7  Returns to the company (Rs. crore)  7095 19545 22632  49272
8  Direct taxes (Rs. crore)  6596 3804 10151  20550
9  Sales including all taxes ((Rs. 
crore)  621307 173137 70630 865074
Ratios Using Measure of Value Added as in (2) above 
10  Value added / Sales (%)  6.80% 20.00% 73.61%  14.90%
11  Indirect taxes / Sales (%)  9.32% 4.66% 13.90%  8.76%
12  Royalties /Value added (%)  0.31% 0.00% 13.89%  5.71%
13  Indirect taxes / Value added (%)  136.97% 23.31% 18.88%  58.80%
13(a)  of which excise duties (%)  130.50% 19.88% 11.75%  52.89%
13(b)  .. sales taxes (%)  1.13% 1.79% 0.62%  1.10%
13(c)  ...other indirect taxes (%)  5.34% 1.64% 6.51%  4.82%
14  Returns to Company / Value added 
(%) 16.78% 56.44% 43.53%  38.23%
15  Direct taxes / value added (%)  15.60% 10.98% 19.52%  15.94%
16  Interest  /value added (%)  8.18% 6.58% 9.71%  8.37%
17  Wages and salaries / value added 
(%)  13.38% 6.51% 12.90% 11.34%
Ratios Using Measure of Value Added as in (1) above 
18  Value added / Sales (%)  3.67% 16.10% 63.06%  11.01%
19  Royalties /Value added (%)  0.58% 0.00% 16.22%  7.72%
20  Indirect taxes / Value added (%)  253.88% 28.95% 22.04%  79.59%
20(a)  of which excise duties (%)  241.90% 24.69% 13.72%  71.59%
20(b)  .. sales taxes (%)  2.09% 2.22% 0.72%  1.49%
20(c)  ...other indirect taxes (%)  9.89% 2.04% 7.60%  6.52%
21  Returns to Company / Value added 
(%) 31.11% 70.10% 50.82%  51.74%
22  Direct taxes / value added (%)  28.92% 13.64% 22.79%  21.58%
23  Interest  /value added (%)  15.16% 8.17% 11.33%  11.32%
24  Wages and salaries / value added 
(%)  24.81% 8.09% 15.06% 15.35%
A-Public Sector Oil Refining and Distribution Companies; B- Pvt Sector Oil Refining, Distribution 
and Production Companies; C-Public Sector Oil Production Companies; D-All Companies.  
Annual Accounts information taken from Prowess Data Base of the Centre for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy. Sales taxes may be correctly captured. Data pertain to the year ending 2008, as 
in the original annul report. (*1) BPCL, Bongaigon Refineries and Petrochemcials, Chennai 
Petroleum, HPCL, IOCL, Kochi Refineries (Merged), Mangalore Refineries and Petrochemicals, and  
Numaligarh Refineries (*2) Cairn Energy, Essar Oil, Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation,  
Hindustan Oil Exploration Corporation, Reliance Industries, Reliance Petroleum (merged). (*3) 
ONGC Videsh, ONGC, Oil India.  
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Table 5: Select Aspects of Sales, Foreign Exchange, Value Added and Taxes from the Aggregate Annual Reports (Rs. crore or %) 
  Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 
All Manufacturing Companies             
Value Added 1 (PBDITA+Compensation - Income from Financial Services)  133488  152609 184809 214610 227665 290559 
Value Added 2 (Sales - Income from Financial Services - RM - Power Fuel etc- 
IBT - Selling and Distribution) 
323658 349934 410441 474270 519566 614619 
Indirect Business Taxes (IBT)  96005  102325 116693 130255 157514 169383 
Sales  871322 961327 1110825 1338385 1552763 1822509 
PBDITA  91076 108927 139348 167645 180932 244862 
Gross Fixed Assets + Current Assets  988277  1038876 1135663 1287788 1488503 1670410 
Forex Earnings  81670  99414 127241 170707 204505 277447 
Forex Spending  157044  186443 220911 317959 438807 502748 
No of firms included  4660  4595 4741 4595 4281 3722 
IBT / Value Added 1  71.9%  67.1% 63.1% 60.7% 69.2% 58.3% 
IBT / Value Added 2  29.7% 29.2% 28.4% 27.5% 30.3% 27.6% 
IBT / Sales   11.0%  10.6% 10.5% 9.7% 10.1% 9.3% 
PBDITA /Total Assets  9.2% 10.5% 12.3% 13.0% 12.2% 14.7% 
Net Forex / Value Added 1  -56.5%  -57.0% -50.7% -68.6% -102.9% -77.5% 
Petroleum Product Companies          
Value Added 1 (PBDITA+Compensation - Income from Financial Services)  20955  27296 32061 31779 30922 41487 
Value Added 2 (Sales - Income from Financial Services - RM - Power Fuel etc- 
IBT - Selling and Distribution) 
133613 141988 160508 183394 202533 245432 
Indirect Business Taxes (IBT)  33835  36023 40869 43879 59548 61257 
Sales  273926 313916 349012 426853 538459 656757 
PBDITA  22685 29425 34624 34229 32954 47471 
Gross Fixed Assets + Current Assets  174566  198437 215307 247195 302931 332630 
Forex Earnings  12079  15508 20272 35994 54773 88180 
Forex Spending  78156  101160 109644 164096 246277 279343 
No of firms included  36  37 42 41 36 29 
IBT / Value Added 1  161.5% 132.0% 127.5% 138.1% 192.6% 147.7% 
IBT / Value Added 2  25.3% 25.4% 25.5% 23.9% 29.4% 25.0% 
IBT / Sales   12.4%  11.5% 11.7% 10.3% 11.1% 9.3% 
PBDITA /Total Assets  13.0% 14.8% 16.1% 13.8% 10.9% 14.3% 
Net Forex / Value Added 1  -315.3%  -313.8% -278.8% -403.1% -619.3% -460.8% 
NB: No of companies included are given. The collation has been over annual reports ending at any time up till Dec of the year. 
Source: Originally from the EIS, of the CMIE.  
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Table 6: Taxes in Relation to Value Added and Profits in the Sector 
   2003-04 2004-05 2005-06  2006-07
1 Customs  duty  9552 11697 9157  10043
2 Cess  4766 4891 4884  6899
3 Excise  duty  35364 38150 47180  51922
4 Royalty  1620 2181 2306  2794
5 Corporate  tax  10038 11180 10896  12153
6 Dividend  6320 7641 7229  7963
7  Tax on dividend  1110 1513 1315  1362
8  Others (incl. service tax)  425 439 347  666
9 Subtotal  69195 77692 83314  93802
10 Sales  tax  32080 38935 46667  53650
11 Royalties  1643 2251 3199  3568
12  Dividend to state governments  18 21 19  22
13  Octroi, duties incl. electricity duty  1032 1313 2211  1891
14 Others  408 734 157  525
15 Subtotal  35181 43254 52253  59656
16 Total  contribution  104376 120946 135567  153458
17  Net value added  17335 23659 28459  n.a
18  Gross value added (GVA)  21210 27740 32691  n.a
19 Gross  output  142989 172778 228439  n.a
20 Gross  profits  14703 21289 25920  n.a
21 Wages  1448 1542 1695  n.a
22  Indirect central taxes / GVA  191.2% 156.7% 160.3%  n.a
23  Indirect state taxes /GVA  158.0% 147.7% 150.0%  n.a
24 Royalties  /GVA  15.4% 16.0% 16.8%  n.a
25  Customs duty /GVA  45.0% 42.2% 28.0%  n.a
26  Direct taxes /profits  52.6% 45.8% 37.4%  n.a
NB: Values in Rs. crore, ratios as %. 
(1) to (16) - from Company Data as reported in Infraline 
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Table 7: Price Build up  on Diesel and Petrol  and Computation of Taxes as a 
Proportion of Value Added. C. 2008 
   MS  Diesel
1  Price paid to refinery (Rs.)  29.95  36.24
2  Inland Freight (Rs.)  0.68  0.76
3  Marketing cost (Rs.)  0.59  0.59
4  Return on capital (Rs.)  0.73  0.71
5  Dealer commission (Rs.)  1.02  0.6
6  Excise Duty (Rs.)  14.78  4.74
7 VAT  (Rs.)  7.59  3.78
8 Total  (Rs.)  55.34  47.42
9  Retail selling price  (Rs.)  45.52  31.76
10  Under recovery to oil marketing companies 
(OMCs)  (Rs.) 
-9.82 -15.66
11  Under recovery to OMCs for the month (Rs. 
crore) 
1250 7860
12  VA by oil companies in distribution and by 
dealers and product transportation  (Rs.) 
3.02 2.66
13  Indirect Taxes paid  (Rs.)  22.37  8.52
14  Total tax on value added (13)/(12)  740.73%  320.30%
15  Implicit quantities sold (in Kilolitres)  1272912  5019157
16  Tax per rupee of retail selling price (13)/(9)  49.14%  26.83%
17  Total taxes collected (Rs. crore)  2847.51  4276.32
  Source (1) to (11) Infraline 7164 Second Fortnight of April, New Delhi 
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Table 8: Some Structural Features of the Oil Economy in India, and the Revealed Conversion Ratio 
  2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06  2006-07 
Crude imports (MT)  74.1 81.99 90.43 95.86 99.41 111.5 121.67 
Crude production (MT)  32.43 33.04 33.37 33.98 32.19 33.988 34.117 
C r u d e  e x p o r t s  ( M T )   000   00 0 0  
Domestic absorption of crude (MT) 106.53 115.03 123.8  129.84 131.6 145.488 155.787 
          
Product imports (MT)  9.27 7.23 7.9 8.83 11.68 17.66 22.72 
Product production (MT)  95.81 104.14 113.46 118.58 119.75 135.26 144.93 
Product exports (MT)  8.37 10.29 14.62 18.21 21.51 33.62 39.33 
Domestic absorption of product (MT) 96.71 101.08 106.74  109.2 109.92 119.3 128.32 
          
Product/Crude conversion ratio as revealed 0.899371 0.905329 0.916478 0.913278 0.909954 0.929699 0.930309 
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Table 9: Prices of Crude and Petroleum Products, and Implicit Refinery Margins in India 
  Prices in $ per MT  Price Ratio to Crude  Consumption Products in India 
 Crude  Petrol  Diesel  Kero-
sene 
LPG Petrol  Diesel  Kero-
sene 



















2-Mar 170.9 225.4 173.6  186.8 194.0 1.319 1.016 1.093 1.135 7011 36546 12688 7728 184 -0.029 -0.7 
2002-03 195.3 256.2 215.3  231.0 279.7 1.312 1.102 1.183 1.432  7570 36644 12674 8351 231 0.066 1.8 
2003-04 205.0 298.6 226.7  245.8 277.0 1.457 1.106 1.199 1.351  7897 37074 12714 9305 245 0.079 2.2 
2004-05 287.4 417.7 349.9  391.1 368.6 1.453 1.218 1.361 1.282  8251 39650 12208 10245 367 0.152 5.9 
2005-06 408.4 550.3 482.7  548.5 481.0 1.347 1.182 1.343 1.178  8647 40191 12837 10456 502 0.107 6.0 
2006-07 457.8 619.4 552.9  608.5 499.7 1.353 1.208 1.329 1.091  9286 42896 13488 10849 563 0.107 6.7 




792.0 979.2 981.4 1059.3 847.3 1.236 1.239 1.338 1.070 10327 42847 13908 11324 975 0.109  11.7 
Apr’08 775.3 998.8 1012.4  1075.2 811.0 1.288 1.306 1.387 1.046 10327 42847 13908 11324 992 0.152  16.1 
May’08 886.3 1109.4 1160.9  1238.3 854.0 1.252 1.310 1.397 0.964 10327 42847 13908 11324 1123 0.141  17.0 
June’08 950.8 1183.8 1206.7  1267.6 910.0 1.245 1.269 1.333 0.957 10327 42847 13908 11324 1171 0.109  14.1 
July’08 971.0 1149.0 1204.4  1287.9 932.0 1.183 1.240 1.326 0.960 10327 42847 13908 11324 1172 0.087  11.5 
Aug’08 828.7 972.2 945.6  1047.1 878.0 1.173 1.141 1.264 1.060 10327 42847 13908 11324 957 0.040  4.5 
Sep’08 709.6 894.1 848.1  920.7 824.0 1.260 1.195 1.298 1.161 10327 42847 13908 11324 863 0.095  9.2 
Oct’08 506.6 657.9 589.9  675.1 802.0 1.299 1.164 1.333 1.583 10327 42847 13908 11324 644 0.145  10.0  
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Table 10: Herfindahl Index of Refining Based on Capacity and Output (000 tonnes) 
 Capacity  Refinery  Output 
   c. 2006-
07 
1999-00 2000-01  20001-02  2002-03  2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
(A) Public Sector  105468 51772 77411 82015 89495 93107 96946 108172 112541 
IOC, Guwahati,    1000 783 707 458 891 1002 864 839 920 
IOC, Barauni, Assam   6000 2416 3122 2994 4304 5082 5553 5469 5634 
IOC, Koyali, Bihar   13700 9334 12006 12434 12758 11698 11543 12953 13714 
IOC, Haldia, Gujarat Bengal  6000 2835 3873 4513 4518 5418 5502 5836 5715 
IOC, Mathura, West Pradesh  8000 7808 7133 8207 8248 6387 7938 8883 8033 
IOC, Digboi, Uttar   650 566 678 581 602 651 615 586 564 
IOC, Panipat, Assam   12000 0 5707 6101 6338 6390 6507 9435 12821 
Total IOC Haryana   47350 23742 33226 35288 37659 36628 38522 44001 47401 
BPCL, Mumbai,    12000 6957 8683 8711 8757 9138 10298 12030 12746 
HPCL, Mumbai, Maharashtra   5500 5766 5575 6078 6108 6118 6249 7419 7409 
HPCL, Visakh, Maharashtra Pradesh  7500 3464 6405 6851 7591 8121 7980 9377 9409 
Total HPCL Andhra   13000 9230 11980 12929 13699 14239 14229 16796 16818 
KRL, Kochi,  (BPCL)  7500 5006 7520 7580 7854 7924 6939 7742 8134 
CPCL, Manali, Kerala Nadu  9500 5698 6046 6176 6387 8181 9680 9784 9802 
CPCL, Narimanam, Tamil Nadu  1000 0 579 643 653 742 682 618 464 
Total CPCL Tamil   10500 5698 6625 6819 7040 8923 10362 10402 10266 
BRPL, Bongaigaon,    2350 1139 1488 1463 2126 2311 2356 2067 2020 
NRL, Numaligarh, Assam   3000 0 1451 1879 2200 2042 2133 2504 2568 
ONGC, Tatipaka, Assam Pradesh  78 0 0 93 91 93 93 94 63 
MRPL, Mangalore, Andhra   9690 0 6438 7253 10069 11809 12014 12536 12525 
(B) Private Sector PRIVATE Karnataka  43500 0 26033 30544 32345 34309 33163 38379 43562 
RPL, Jamnagar,    33000 0 26033 30544 32345 34309 33163 36616 36931 
ESSAR Oil Gujarat Vadinar**  10500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1763 6631 
Total (a+b) Ltd.   148968 51772 103444 112559 121840 127416 130109 146551 156103 
Hindex of firms  0.182 0.282 0.201 0.204 0.199 0.191 0.189 0.188 0.182 
Hindex of units  0.097 0.118 0.114 0.121 0.117 0.118 0.113 0.110 0.104  
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Figure 1:  
World Prices of Crude and Events That Have Influenced Crude Prices 
Source: History and Analysis – Crude Oil Prices (http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm) 
Figure 2 
 































PFCE: Fuel and power (at current prices (new series))
PFCE: Electricity (at current prices (new series))
PFCE: Liquified petroleum gas (at current prices (new series))
PFCE: Kerosene oil (at current prices (new series))
PFCE: Other fuel (at current prices (new series))
ALL PFCE
PFCE: Food beverages and tobacco (at current prices (new series)) 
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Private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) (at constant 99-00 prices (new series))
PFCE: Liquified petroleum gas (at constant 99-00 prices (new series))
PFCE: Kerosene oil (at constant 99-00 prices (new series))
PFCE: Other fuel (at constant 99-00 prices (new series))
Indirect Taxes / Value Added (1) in All 





















All Mfg. Petroleum products 
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Stabilization Tax (Subsidy) $/bbl Fund Surplus (Deficit) $ billion
Crude Futures 12M MA (right axis) Stabilized Price (right axis)
Performance of stabilization with fund of $25 b and 3 months target cover. For almost a year, 
from October 2007 to September 2008, stabilization is incomplete and during March-August 
2008, stabilization has to be virtually abandoned as the stabilization fund does not have 
enough money. 
 
Indirect Taxes / Value Added (1) and 



















All Mfg. Petroleum products
All Mfg. Petroleum products 
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Figure 9: 















































Stabilization Tax (Subsidy) $/bbl Fund Surplus (Deficit) $ billion
Crude Futures 12M MA (right axis) Stabilized Price (right axis)
 
Performance of stabilization with fund of $40 b and 3 months target cover. During May-August 
2008, stabilization is partial as the stabilization fund does not have enough money. In late 
June and early July 2008, less than half of the price spike is eliminated through stabilization. 
Figure 10: 




































Crack Spread (3:2:1) 12M MA Crack Spread (3:2:1) 1M MA
This chart shows one month and twelve month moving averages of the 3:2:1 crack spread at 
Nymex. This is computed by adding the price of two barrels of gasoline to the price of one 
barrel of fuel oil, subtracting the price of three barrels of crude oil and dividing the result by 
three. It measures the approximate refining margin from refining one barrel of crude. Since 
the gasoline and fuel contracts are quoted in cents per gallon, and a barrel is 42 gallons, 
these prices are multiplied by 0.42 to obtain the price in dollars per barrel. 
 
 